1.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001

“… the balance of advantage to maintaining the NFZs would require the most careful

consideration.”

349.  On 3 August, an official in the British Embassy Washington reported that one

senior US official had said that the debate over the proposed attacks had “given greater

impetus” to the need to develop the overall US strategy on Iraq; and that substantive

outcomes were “unlikely in days, but possible in weeks”.191

350.  Mr Brummell wrote to the MOD on 9 August, setting out Lord Goldsmith’s views.192

Lord Goldsmith had concluded “that proportionate attacks by UK forces on the … two

targets could be justified in the context of Allied operations in the southern No-Fly Zone”.

351.  Mr Brummell also set out Lord Goldsmith’s views on proposed attacks by US

forces. Referring to earlier correspondence with the FCO, Mr Brummell noted the UK’s

“potential international legal responsibility” for attacks carried out by the US in the NFZs,

and, with regard to the planned action, “the assurances provided by the US that, in

relation to all three proposed targets, no civilian casualties may be expected to result

from the attacks and that there may be expected no more than minor damage to civilian

buildings and facilities”. On that basis, the Attorney General had advised: “Provided the

responsible senior Ministers are satisfied that these US projections are reliable, and that

the US Government are satisfied as to the lawfulness of the proposed attacks”, he saw

no reason to question that “proportionate attacks by US forces on the … targets … could

be justified in the context of Allied operations in the southern No-Fly Zone”.

352.  A number of attacks were carried out on 10 August, including an attack by the

US on a target previously assigned to UK forces. That attack was carried out during

daylight hours.

353.  Mr Brummell wrote to the MOD on 15 August referring to the concerns the Attorney

General had expressed in giving his consent, regarding the importance he had attached

to the MOD’s assurance that the attack would be carried out at night to avoid the risk of

harm to people working in the vicinity of the buildings.193 MOD officials had also made

clear that any change in circumstances would be brought to the Attorney General’s

attention. Mr Brummell recorded that Lord Goldsmith had asked that the written report

on the attacks should address the points he had raised; and that his concerns should be

drawn to Mr Hoon’s attention.

354.  Mr Hoon’s Private Office replied to Mr Brummell on 3 September.194 The letter

stressed the importance that Mr Hoon attached to the Law Officers’ advice and that

he was fully aware of the need to ensure that the actions of coalition partners were

“governed by similar principles”. Mr Hoon was “confident that US commanders are very

191  Telegram 886 Washington to FCO London, 3 August 2001, ‘Iraq’.

192  Letter Brummell to Nash, 9 August 2001 ‘Iraq: No Fly Zones (NFZs) – Target Clearance’.

193  Letter Brummell to Nash, 15 August 2001, ‘Iraq Targeting’.

194  Letter Moffatt to Brummell, 3 September 2001, [untitled].

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