The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
910.
Lord
Goldsmith provided draft advice to Mr Blair on 14 January
2003.
As instructed
he did not, at that time, provide a copy of his advice to
Mr Straw
or to
Mr Hoon.
911.
Although
Lord Goldsmith was invited to attend Cabinet on 16 January,
there
was no
discussion of Lord Goldsmith’s views.
912.
Mr Straw
was aware, in general terms, of Lord Goldsmith’s position but
he
was not
provided with a copy of Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice before
Cabinet on
16 January.
He did not read it until at least two weeks later.
913.
The draft
advice of 14 January should have been provided to
Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon
and the Cabinet Secretary, all of whose responsibilities were
directly
engaged.
914.
Lord
Goldsmith provided Mr Blair with further advice on 30
January.
It was not
seen by anyone outside No.10.
915.
Lord
Goldsmith discussed the negotiating history of resolution
1441
with
Mr Straw, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, with White House officials
and the
State
Department’s Legal Advisers. They argued that resolution 1441 could
be
interpreted
as not requiring a second resolution. The US Government’s
position
was that it
would not have agreed to resolution 1441 had its terms required
one.
916.
When Lord
Goldsmith met No.10 officials on 27 February, he told
them
that he had
reached the view that a “reasonable case” could be made
that
resolution
1441 was capable of reviving the authorisation to use force
in
resolution
678 (1990) without a further resolution, if there were strong
factual
grounds for
concluding that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity
offered
by resolution 1441.
917.
Until that
time, No.10 could not have been sure that Lord Goldsmith
would
advise that
there was a basis on which military action against Iraq could be
taken
in the
absence of a further decision of the Security Council.
918.
In the
absence of Lord Goldsmith’s formal advice, uncertainties about
the
circumstances
in which the UK would be able to participate in military
action
continued,
although the possibility of a second resolution
remained.
919.
Lord
Goldsmith provided formal written advice on 7 March.
920.
Lord
Goldsmith’s formal advice of 7 March set out alternative
interpretations
of the
legal effect of resolution 1441. He concluded that the safer route
would be
to seek a
second resolution, and he set out the ways in which, in the absence
of
a second
resolution, the matter might be brought before a court. Lord
Goldsmith
164