6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
•
Turkey
would be wary of any regime change plan that encouraged or
created
the
conditions in which Kurdish separatism may grow in strength. It
wanted
a stable,
unitary and secular Iraq.
•
Iraq would
remain a unitary state but many of the structural problems
would
remain and:
“We should also expect considerable anti‑Western
sentiment
among a
populace that has experienced ten years of sanctions.”
•
“A US
attempt to create a more equitable long‑term distribution of power
in
Iraq would
require massive and lengthy commitment. Modern Iraq has
been
dominated
politically, militarily and socially by the Sunni. To alter that
would
entail
re‑creation of Iraq’s civil, political and military structures.
That would
require a
US‑directed transition of power (ie US troops occupying
Baghdad)
and support
thereafter. Ten years seems a not unrealistic time span for
such
a project.”
73.
The paper was
sent to Mr Hoon, the Chiefs of Staff, Sir Kevin
Tebbit,30
Mr Webb,
Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott, Deputy Chief of the
Defence
Staff
(Commitments), and a small number of other individuals. It was also
sent to
Mr John Scarlett,
the Chairman of the JIC, the Assessments Staff, Mr Tom Dodd,
OD
Sec,
Dr Amanda Tanfield, FCO Head of Iraq Section, Middle East
Department, and SIS.
74.
The paper was
subsequently included in the pack of reading material on Iraq
for
Mr Blair,
sent to No.10 by Mr Scarlett on 1 August (see Section
3.4).
75.
On 6 March,
the Chiefs of Staff were informed that Iraq was “sliding rapidly up
the
scale of
interest and a degree of strategic planning was essential at some
point in the
near
future, given the lead times necessary to shape pol/mil thinking
effectively”.31
76.
The Chiefs of
Staff agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall, Vice
Chief
of the
Defence Staff (VCDS), who was chairing the meeting in CDS’s
absence, should
“refresh”
work on Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) to ensure that it
was not left
“too late”.
77.
The process of
identifying and agreeing UORs to equip UK forces deployed to
Iraq
later in
2002 is addressed in Section 6.3.
78.
Discussions
with the Treasury on funding for operations in Iraq are addressed
in
Section
13.
79.
Cabinet on
7 March was assured that no decision to launch military action
had
been taken
and “any action would be in accordance with international
law”.
30
Sir Kevin
Tebbit was appointed KCB in the 2002 New Year Honours
List.
31
Minutes, 6
March 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
187