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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
By early January 2003, Mr Blair had concluded that Iraq had had “no change of
heart” and military action to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime was likely to be
required to disarm Iraq.
The US Administration was planning military action no later than early March.
Mr Blair and Mr Straw concluded that a second UN resolution would be essential
to secure domestic and international support for military action. In the absence
of a “smoking gun”, that would require more time and a series of reports from
the UN inspectors which established a pattern of Iraqi non‑compliance with
its obligations.
Mr Blair secured President Bush’s support for a second resolution but did not
secure agreement that the inspections process should continue until the end
of March or early April. That left little time for the inspections process to provide
the evidence that would be needed to achieve international agreement on the
way ahead.
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003
805.  The following key findings are from Section 3.7:
By the time the Security Council met on 7 March 2003 there were deep divisions
within it on the way ahead on Iraq.
Following President Bush’s agreement to support a second resolution to help
Mr Blair, Mr Blair and Mr Straw continued during February and early March 2003
to develop the position that Saddam Hussein was not co‑operating as required
by resolution 1441 (2002) and, if that situation continued, a second resolution
should be adopted stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered
by the Security Council.
On 6 February, Mr Blair said that the UK would consider military action without
a further resolution only if the inspectors reported that they could not do their
job and a resolution was vetoed unreasonably. The UK would not take military
action without a majority in the Security Council.
Mr Blair’s proposals, on 19 February, for a side statement defining tough tests
for Iraq’s co‑operation and a deadline of 14 March for a vote by the Security
Council, were not agreed by the US.
The initial draft of a US, UK and Spanish resolution tabled on 24 February, which
simply invited the Security Council to decide that Iraq had failed to take the final
opportunity offered by resolution 1441, failed to attract support.
Throughout February, the divisions in the Security Council widened.
France, Germany and Russia set out their common position on 10 and
24 February. Their joint Memorandum of 24 February called for a programme of
continued and reinforced inspections with a clear timeline and a military build-up
to exert maximum pressure on Iraq to disarm.
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