The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
By early
January 2003, Mr Blair had concluded that Iraq had had “no
change of
heart” and
military action to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime was likely to
be
required to
disarm Iraq.
•
The US
Administration was planning military action no later than early
March.
•
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw concluded that a second UN resolution would be
essential
to secure
domestic and international support for military action. In the
absence
of a
“smoking gun”, that would require more time and a series of reports
from
the UN
inspectors which established a pattern of Iraqi non‑compliance
with
its obligations.
•
Mr Blair
secured President Bush’s support for a second resolution but did
not
secure
agreement that the inspections process should continue until the
end
of March
or early April. That left little time for the inspections process
to provide
the
evidence that would be needed to achieve international agreement on
the
way
ahead.
805.
The following
key findings are from Section 3.7:
•
By the time
the Security Council met on 7 March 2003 there were deep
divisions
within it
on the way ahead on Iraq.
•
Following
President Bush’s agreement to support a second resolution to
help
Mr Blair,
Mr Blair and Mr Straw continued during February and early
March 2003
to develop
the position that Saddam Hussein was not co‑operating as
required
by
resolution 1441 (2002) and, if that situation continued, a second
resolution
should be
adopted stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity
offered
by the
Security Council.
•
On 6
February, Mr Blair said that the UK would consider military
action without
a further
resolution only if the inspectors reported that they could not do
their
job and a
resolution was vetoed unreasonably. The UK would not take
military
action
without a majority in the Security Council.
•
Mr Blair’s
proposals, on 19 February, for a side statement defining tough
tests
for Iraq’s
co‑operation and a deadline of 14 March for a vote by the
Security
Council,
were not agreed by the US.
•
The initial
draft of a US, UK and Spanish resolution tabled on 24 February,
which
simply
invited the Security Council to decide that Iraq had failed to take
the final
opportunity
offered by resolution 1441, failed to attract support.
•
Throughout
February, the divisions in the Security Council
widened.
•
France,
Germany and Russia set out their common position on 10
and
24 February.
Their joint Memorandum of 24 February called for a programme
of
continued
and reinforced inspections with a clear timeline and a military
build-up
to exert
maximum pressure on Iraq to disarm.
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