The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
confidence
that water supply to major cities would not be interrupted even in
times of
peak
demand.
1018.
The report on
gender issues stated that this was a “major emphasis” for
the
CPA and a
“personal focus” for Ambassador Bremer.595
Civil
society organisations were
developing
strongly, though political organisations were only now emerging.
Women
had taken
on visible leadership roles in Iraq and the TAL set a goal of 25
percent
representation
in the Transitional Government. Funding was not an issue; the
key
challenges
were security and opportunities in education and
employment.
1019.
The report on
“schools, universities, hospitals” (from Mr Chris Segar, Head
of the
British
Office Baghdad) stated that the Ministries of Health and Education
were both
regarded as
having good political and strategic leadership and competent
management
staff, and
had established “normal” relationships with international
donors.596
US
funds
were
available for infrastructure; UK support was provided through the
World Bank and
UN Trust
Funds. Nearly all the 240 hospitals in Iraq were functioning,
though many
faced
(unspecified) difficulties. Drug supply continued to fall below
Iraqi expectations,
but drugs
were more widely available, especially to the poor, than before the
conflict.
2,300 schools
had re-opened in time for the new school year (on 1 October
2003),
staffed and
equipped with textbooks and materials.
1020.
The report on
oil sector development stated that production was rising
ahead
of
schedule, but future capacity was threatened by an early, mistaken
focus on repair
rather than
modernisation and development.597
Discussions
between the Ministry of
Oil and the
CPA on raising gasoline prices continued, with the Ministry
avoiding any
commitment
on a politically contentious issue. Discussions on restructuring
the oil
industry
“remained mired in politics”. There were persistent but unconfirmed
allegations
of
corruption in both the State Oil and Marketing Organisation and the
Ministry of Oil.
Ambassador
Bremer had recently appointed a new Inspector General to the
Ministry,
but after
30 June his capacity to monitor financial flows would be tested.
International
oil
companies were watching carefully, but wanted to see greater
security and a stable
regulatory
and investment environment before investing.
1021.
On 26 April,
Mr Rycroft set out Mr Blair’s response to the reports in
a letter to
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary, copies of which were sent to DFID, the MOD, the
Cabinet
Office and
UK officials in Iraq and the US:
“The
conclusion the Prime Minister draws … is that the problem we face
is not
multi‑faceted.
It is simple: security. It casts its shadow over everything from
oil
production
to education to the political process.”598
595
Telegram
188 IraqRep to FCO London, 22 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Gender
Issues’.
596
Telegram
035 IraqRep to FCO London, 22 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Health and
Education’.
597
Telegram
183 IraqRep to FCO London, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Oil Sector
Development’.
598
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 26 April 2004, ‘Iraq: 15 Reports for the Prime
Minister’.
176