6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
conceivable
that any new Iraqi regime – and, in particular, one led by another
‘strong
man’ –
would wish to have WMD to meet the perceived regional threat from
Iran …”
186.
Mr Hoon
stated that he was content for thinking to continue, but decided
it
should be
kept on “a very close hold until Ministers agreed otherwise”. For
him, “the
key
question was: how far ahead of a decision to deploy would we have
to start any
necessary
preparatory action”.
187.
Mr Webb
explained to the Inquiry that the way he had posed the issues in
his
minute was
a means of finding out from Mr Hoon if he knew or could find
out what the
position
was:
“This was
commissioned as a think piece. But … my duty is to say to my
Secretary
of State,
you need, we need to have a feel for whether the Prime Minister
has
committed
us here, because it affects what we do next.”94
188.
Mr Webb
added that he had not got an explicit response on that
point.
189.
Mr Hoon
did not formally write to Mr Blair setting out possible
options for a UK
contribution
to military operations until 31 May.
190.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry that after Crawford the MOD “started ramping up
our …
thinking on
… what we could provide”.95
191.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that it should not assume that the MOD
was
looking for
the military option at that point. Rather, if the military was to
be in a position
to produce
a military option “at a much later date”, a “very long planning
process [was]
required”
and it had to start thinking about the issues “as early as
possible”. The work
was “very,
very preliminary ground clearing”.96
192.
Sir Kevin
subsequently told the Inquiry that, to produce a large scale option
on
the ground,
serious planning had to start six months earlier.97
The
military papers
and records
would “indicate clarity of intent, when in fact what there was, was
a
determination
to provide the politicians with the option”.
193.
The MOD
established an informal inter‑departmental group of
senior
officials,
the “Pigott Group”, to identify the issues which might need to
be
addressed
if military action was taken in Iraq.
194.
The
discussions of the Group were not recorded.
94
Private
hearing, 23 June 2010, page 11.
95
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 11.
96
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 14‑16.
97
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 10‑11.
205