4.4 | The
search for WMD
595.
Mr Scarlett
wrote that, if asked whether the UK was still confident that
weapons
would be
found, the answer could be: “a lot of work has been going on, there
is a lot of
work still
to do, and a lot of questions still to answer. We do not know how
it will turn out
in the
end.”
596.
If asked
whether the Government stood by the intelligence assessment in
the
September
2002 dossier, the answer could be: “we stand by the dossier as our
best
assessment
on the information available at the time. Since September 2002 a
great deal
has
happened. Again, we do not know what the ISG’s eventual assessment
will be.”
597.
Mr Scarlett
described the purpose of the points offered as “a way of looking
ahead
to the
future”, building on Mr Blair’s comments in his interview with
Sir David Frost on
11 January.
If they were to be used, the UK “must warn the Americans
first”.
598.
Mr Rycroft
described Mr Scarlett’s note to Mr Blair as:
“The first
draft of a narrative on WMD to move our position on slightly, by
floating
possible
explanations for the lack of WMD found so far, through questions
rather
599.
In relation to
Mr Scarlett’s point that the assessments pre-conflict had
been
accepted by
most major governments, Mr Rycroft drew Mr Blair’s
attention to the
provisions
of resolution 1441 (2002), which had included:
“Recognising
the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions
and
proliferation
of WMD + long range missiles poses to international peace +
security”.
600.
On
23 January, Mr Tenet announced Dr Kay’s resignation and
the appointment of
Mr Charles
Duelfer, who had been Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM from
1993
to 2000, as
the new Head of the ISG.329
601.
Mr Tenet
wrote in his memoir that he continued to defend the independence of
the
ISG under
Mr Duelfer: “My guidance to Duelfer – just like my guidance to
Kay – and to
everyone in
the ISG was simply to go out and find the truth.”330
602.
Mr Duelfer
wrote that Mr Tenet “made good on his commitment” and
instructed that
the ISG
should not be seeking to justify the NIE.331
603.
In late
January, the Government highlighted to the US the sensitivity in
the
UK of
public comments in the US about the apparent absence of WMD in
Iraq.
604.
UK
officials suggested that the two countries should keep in close
step over
their
responses to calls for public inquiries into pre-conflict
intelligence.
328
Manuscript
comment Rycroft to Prime Minister on Minute Scarlett to Rycroft,
22 January 2004,
‘Iraq: WMD’.
329
CIA News
& Information, 23 January 2004, DCI
Announces Duelfer to Succeed Kay as Special Advisor.
330
Tenet G
& Harlow B. At the
Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA.
HarperPress, 2007.
331
Duelfer
C. Hide and
Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public
Affairs, 2009.
543