4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
“In
determining whether to use CBW, Saddam would have to balance the
risk of
strengthening
the Coalition’s political case for removing him against the
desire
to widen
the war by involving Israel or inflicting unacceptable casualties
upon
the
coalition. We judge that, faced with the likelihood of military
defeat and being
removed
from power, it is unlikely Saddam could be deterred from ordering
the
use of
CBW.”
97.
The JIC stated
that Iraqi responses to a Coalition attack might
include:
•
“CBW
terrorism: although Iraq probably lacks the capability to deploy
a
sophisticated
device …”
•
“using
non-lethal BW in a deniable manner to cause sickness amongst
Coalition
troops as
they assembled;”
•
“Iraq …
might also target the civilian Shia or Kurdish populations,
possibly
with CBW.”
98.
Operative
paragraph 3 (OP3) of resolution 1441 required Iraq to
provide:
“… not
later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently
accurate, full
and
complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop
chemical,
biological,
and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other delivery systems
such
as unmanned
vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft,
including
any
holdings and the precise locations of such weapons, components,
sub-
components,
stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the
locations
and work of
its research development and production facilities, as well as all
other
chemical,
biological, and nuclear programmes, including for any which it
claims are
for
purposes not related to weapons production or
material.”33
99.
Iraq’s
declaration was provided on 7 December 2002.34
The
declaration was
detailed
and technical, written in a combination of English, Russian and
Arabic, with
approximately
7,000 pages dealing with ballistic missile projects. A backlog of
semi-
annual
declarations of activity, covering the period 1998-2002, which Iraq
had already
provided to
UNMOVIC, was not at that time available to the UK.
100.
Mr Blair
was advised on 11 December that there was impatience in the
US
Administration
and it was looking at military action as early as mid-February
2003.
101.
Sir David
Manning and Sir Richard Dearlove, Chief of the Secret
Intelligence
Service,
had a joint meeting with Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s
National
33
UN Security
Council resolution 1441 (2002).
34
JIC
Assessment, 18 December 2002, ‘An Initial Assessment of Iraq’s WMD
Declaration’.
309