6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
666.
The SPG
recorded that the Chiefs of Staff had:
“… already
voiced clear reservations over the integration of substantial UK
land
forces in
the southern theatre. Therefore, if we are to be engaged in
combat
operations
the US and UK military preference is that we should be in northern
Iraq.”
667.
The SPG
identified a number of concerns, including:
•
The
“evident” complexities of the command relationship between
CENTCOM
and EUCOM,
“against the need to deliver a compliant Turkey”.
•
The
inability to conduct a detailed reconnaissance created a
“significant risk”.
•
Northern
Iraq was “a difficult area politically”. Turkey still remembered
the UK’s
role in
creating an Iraq which included Mosul “and its associated
oilfields”.
The Kurds
remembered the UK’s assistance in Op HAVEN [in 1991], but
were
“equally
quick to remember that it was the RAF that effectively suppressed
a
number of
Kurdish revolts”. There was a “real danger that post conflict the
UK,
simply
through our force location, would retain the ‘lead’ in the North,
thereby
splitting
our lines of communication [with other forces in the Gulf] … and
placing
us in an
intractable position for some time”.
668.
The SPG
confirmed that there was “broad agreement between MOD and
PJHQ
staffs” on
the option recommended by PJHQ.
669.
Also on 19
September, the Chiefs of Staff discussed a draft submission to
Mr Hoon
circulated
by Lt Gen Pigott.268
670.
The minutes of
the COS discussion recorded that “a simultaneous
advance
of forces
in the southern and northern axes [would be] key to overwhelming
the Iraqi
decision
making process”; and that Gen Franks “strongly favoured a
UK‑led force in the
North” as
an alternative to deploying a US infantry division.
671.
A “Package 4”
was being developed “to address the inevitable post‑conflict
tasks”.
Adm Boyce
commented that it was “inconceivable that the UK would not
contribute in
some
manner, to those tasks”.
672.
Lt Gen Reith
strongly recommended offering a limited version of Option 3: a
land
option of a
divisional headquarters and a square armoured brigade (with four
battalions
or
regiments) operating alongside a US formation.
673.
Gen Walker
expressed some misgivings. Although the force package was
about
right, he
“did not believe the plan as currently envisaged, to be a viable
concept”. He
was
concerned about the semi‑autonomous nature of the UK forces and
integration with
the US as
envisaged, the lack of an operational reserve, assumptions on Iraq
combat
capability,
and the reliance on air power.
268
Minutes, 19
September 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
275