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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
645.  Mr Sawers judged that:
“We are ending the year in better shape on Iraq than looked likely during much of
the autumn. But we continue to face formidable problems inside Iraq if we are to
maintain stability and deliver a handover of power to a Transitional Government
in June 2004.”
646.  Mr Sawers described increasing engagement on Iraq within the EU, and from the
UN. On security, he wrote:
“… the critical aspect to get right is to ensure that Iraqiisation moves ahead in step
with Iraqi capability and the prevailing security conditions. We must not fall into the
trap of equating numbers with capability.”
647.  Short-term issues to be tackled included “the fuel crisis” through the Iraqi winter
and drafting the TAL by the end of February 2004, but also:
“We will also have to find a solution to the problem of the Governing Council’s
determination that they should continue to exist in some form after 30 June.”
648.  At the end of December, Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that he had spent the
holiday period in bilateral discussions with key GC members.359
649.  Discussions had clarified the difficulties faced by the GC in drafting the TAL. The
main obstacles were: the mechanism for choosing the Transitional National Assembly,
and Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s demands for elections; Kurdish efforts “to push for what
amounts to secession”; and the future of the GC post-transition.
650.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald told the Inquiry that the UK was in favour of sticking to the
timetable set out on 15 November throughout the political process, despite “a lot of
debate about whether things should be postponed or not because of security”.360
January 2004
651.  In his New Year telegram to the FCO, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote that the
Coalition faced a significant challenge in the first six months of 2004 as they prepared to
transfer sovereignty.361
652.  The first of the “hurdles in front of us” was that:
“The violent opposition have capacity, people and materials in ineradicable
quantities for this timescale, even if their strategic reach is limited.”
359  Telegram 333 IraqRep to FCO London, 29 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Developments’.
360  Public hearing, 16 December 2009, pages 34-35.
361  Telegram 337 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Six Final Months of Occupation’.
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