The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
49.
Managing a
joint occupation of such size and complexity effectively and
coherently
required
regular formal and informal discussion and clear decision-making at
all levels,
both
between capitals and in-country. Once attempts to agree an MOU had
failed, the
chances of
constructing such mechanisms were slim.
50.
In the absence
of an MOU with the US, the UK’s influence in Baghdad
depended
heavily on
the personal impact of successive Special Representatives and
British
Ambassadors
to Iraq and the relationships they were able to build with
senior
US figures.
51.
Some instances
of important CPA decisions in which the UK played little or
no
formal part
were:
•
The
decision to issue CPA Order No.2, which “dissolved” (or
disbanded)
a number
of military and other security entities that had operated as part
of
Saddam
Hussein’s regime, including the armed forces (see Section 12).
This was
raised
informally by Ambassador Bremer in his first meeting with
Mr John
Sawers,
Mr Blair’s Special Representative on Iraq, who – unbriefed –
did not at
that point
take a contrary position. The concept of creating a new army had
also
been raised
by Mr Walt Slocombe, CPA Senior Adviser on National Security
and
Defense, in
discussion with Mr Hoon. Dissolution was a key decision which
was
to have a
significant effect on the alienation of the Sunni community and
the
development
of an insurgency in Iraq, and the terms and timing of this
important
Order
should have been approved by both Washington and
London.
•
Decisions
on how to spend the Development Fund for Iraq, which
resolution
1483 gave
the CPA the power to make. CPA Regulation No.2
subsequently
vested
Ambassador Bremer with control of the Fund, effectively placing
it
under US
control. This exacerbated concerns about the
under-resourcing
of
CPA(South) as expressed in Mr Straw’s letter to Mr Blair
of 5 June 2003
(see Section
10.1).
•
The
creation of the Iraqi Central Bank as an independent body in July
2003
(see
Sections 9.2 and 10.1). This came as a surprise to the UK despite
the
close
involvement of officials from the Treasury in arrangements for
Iraq’s new
currency
and budget.
•
The
creation of a new Iraqi Central Criminal Court (see Section 9.2),
the
announcement
of which UK officials could not delay for long enough
to
enable the
Attorney General to give his view on its legality under the
terms
of resolution 1483.
•
Production
of the CPA’s ‘Vision for Iraq’ and ‘Achieving the Vision’
(see
Sections 9.2
and 10.1).
Mr Sawers
alerted the FCO to the first document on
6 July when
it was already at an advanced stage of drafting, and by 18 July
it
had been
signed off by the Pentagon. No formal UK approval was sought
for
a document
which was intended to provide strategic direction to the
Coalition’s
non-military
effort in Iraq.
478