The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
3. What
role does Islam play in Iraqi political life? How strong is Iraqi
secularism?
Would it
survive the fall of the Ba’ath?
4. What
links does Iraq have to terrorism these days?
5.
Post-Saddam, how quickly would the Iraqi economy revive? Who would
control
the oil
etc?
6. What is
the future of Iraqi relations with Iran? Can they co-operate or are
they
condemned
to remain rivals for power at the north of the Gulf?
7. Is there
a prospect that Iraq can co-operate with the other Gulf Arab
states, or
will
Baghdad, as the historical centre of power and the most populous
Arab state
in the
region, always try to dominate? What are the possible models for
security
and
stability in the Gulf region in the future? Can Iraq ever work with
the GCC
[Gulf
Co-operation Council]?
8. Would
change in Iraq destabilise other states like Syria (further
undermining the
credibility
of the Ba’ath there) or Jordan? Is there really a prospect that
change in
Iraq could
unlock movement on the MEPP?”
791.
At the
seminar, Mr Blair made clear that the discussion was off the record
and “any
discussion
of post-Saddam Iraq did not imply that regime change was our policy
or was
792.
Not all the
questions on the agenda were addressed at the seminar. The
No.10
record
stated that there were “no blinding insights”. Points put forward
by the academics
included:
•
Some
members of the Iraqi regime were arguing that any change of
regime
would be
worse for the Iraqi people: “Iraqis feared disorder; Saddam
guaranteed
stability”.
•
The most
likely successor to Saddam Hussein was another
General.
•
Changing
Iraq substantively would mean tackling:
{{the
shadow state behind the publicly visible state;
{{the role
of the armed forces; and
{{the
political economy of oil, which led to a highly centralised
bureaucracy
and the
power of patronage.
•
There would
be tricky decisions on the extent of co-operation with
existing
structures,
including the Ba’ath Party, with differing views on whether it
would
survive
Saddam Hussein’s downfall.
•
There was
no existing process like the Afghan Loya Jirga that could be used
to
build
future governance structures.
390
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 20 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
seminar with academics,
19 November’.
246