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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Claims that Iraq had “reconstructed and renewed the sites … previously used in
producing biological agents” were “groundless and false”.
Iraq did “not possess any missile with a range greater than 150km”.
The new engine test station was for “horizontal testing” of “Al Samoud” engines
and “could not be used for larger engines”.
RPVs [remotely piloted vehicles] were for aerial reconnaissance.
Facilities at the al-Mamoun plant had been destroyed and it could not be used
for solid fuel missiles.
15.  A review of the rebuttal by the Assessments Staff stated that it did not
undermine the UK dossier and in a number of key areas failed to provide a
credible response.
16.  Mr Julian Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, told Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s
Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence
Secretariat (OD Sec), that a review of the rebuttal conducted by the Assessments Staff,
the intelligence agencies and the FCO dismissed the rebuttal as: “In broad terms … very
weak; long on rhetoric and short on detail.”2
17.  Mr Miller added that the document presented “a somewhat rosy picture” of Iraq’s
relationship with UNSCOM. He characterised Iraq’s refutation of the UK “claim that its
WMD programmes have continued post 1998” as an “attitude of denial”.
18.  Mr Miller stated that there was “nothing in the detail of the Iraqi reply” that
undermined the dossier and that:
“In a number of key areas they have failed to provide any credible response.
For example they:
claim that accusations that they are seeking uranium from South Africa is a
‘bogus lie’. But the dossier did not mention South Africa …
claim the al-Rafah [engine] test stand is for horizontal rather than vertical
engine testing Al Samoud missile …
merely state that accusations of mobile biological agent production facilities
are ‘astonishing’.”
19.  Under a heading ‘Iraq: Still Playing Games’, press lines prepared by the
Communications and Information Centre (CIC) focused on:
Iraq’s pre-1998 co-operation with UNSCOM and its failures to:
{{provide full and comprehensive disclosures;
2  Minute Miller to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘The Dossier: Iraq’s Response’ attaching Email FCO [junior
official] to Hamill, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq’s reply on Blair’s Report’ and Paper [CIC], [undated], ‘Iraq – Still
Playing Games’.
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