The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Claims that
Iraq had “reconstructed and renewed the sites … previously used
in
producing
biological agents” were “groundless and false”.
•
Iraq did
“not possess any missile with a range greater than
150km”.
•
The new
engine test station was for “horizontal testing” of “Al Samoud”
engines
and “could
not be used for larger engines”.
•
RPVs
[remotely piloted vehicles] were for aerial
reconnaissance.
•
Facilities
at the al-Mamoun plant had been destroyed and it could not be
used
for solid
fuel missiles.
15.
A review of
the rebuttal by the Assessments Staff stated that it did
not
undermine
the UK dossier and in a number of key areas failed to provide
a
credible
response.
16.
Mr Julian
Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, told Sir David Manning,
Mr Blair’s
Foreign
Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and
Defence
Secretariat
(OD Sec), that a review of the rebuttal conducted by the
Assessments Staff,
the
intelligence agencies and the FCO dismissed the rebuttal as: “In
broad terms … very
weak; long
on rhetoric and short on detail.”2
17.
Mr Miller
added that the document presented “a somewhat rosy picture” of
Iraq’s
relationship
with UNSCOM. He characterised Iraq’s refutation of the UK “claim
that its
WMD
programmes have continued post 1998” as an “attitude of
denial”.
18.
Mr Miller
stated that there was “nothing in the detail of the Iraqi reply”
that
undermined
the dossier and that:
“In a
number of key areas they have failed to provide any credible
response.
For example
they:
•
claim that
accusations that they are seeking uranium from South Africa is
a
‘bogus
lie’. But the dossier did not mention South Africa …
•
claim the
al-Rafah [engine] test stand is for horizontal rather than
vertical
engine
testing Al Samoud missile …
•
merely
state that accusations of mobile biological agent production
facilities
are ‘astonishing’.”
19.
Under a
heading ‘Iraq: Still Playing Games’, press lines prepared by
the
Communications
and Information Centre (CIC) focused on:
•
Iraq’s
pre-1998 co-operation with UNSCOM and its failures to:
{{provide
full and comprehensive disclosures;
2
Minute
Miller to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘The Dossier: Iraq’s Response’
attaching Email FCO [junior
official]
to Hamill, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq’s reply on Blair’s Report’ and
Paper [CIC], [undated], ‘Iraq – Still
Playing
Games’.
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