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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
334.  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched humanitarian appeals on
20 March, each for approximately US$80m.197
335.  Ms Short wrote to Mr Boateng the following day to request an additional
£120m from the Reserve for humanitarian assistance for Iraq.198
336.  Ms Short advised that she could provide £80m for humanitarian assistance
from DFID’s core budget in 2003/04 (£75m from its Contingency Reserve of £90m
and £5m from the existing Iraq programme). That was in addition to the £10m
already provided from DFID’s 2002/03 budget to UN agencies and NGOs. From the
£80m available, she had:
earmarked £65m for the UN’s forthcoming initial Flash Appeal, which was
expected to seek US$1.9bn to cover the first six months of the crisis; and
agreed to provide £10m to support further preparations by the World Food
Programme, the Red Cross and NGOs.
337.  Ms Short stated that with only £5m left, and with demand for funding expected to
accelerate fast as humanitarian agencies moved from preparing to delivering, she now
needed an extra £120m from the Reserve:
£35m for the Red Cross appeals launched on 20 March;
£20m for NGO programmes;
£15m for DFID’s bilateral effort, to deliver direct emergency support to fill gaps
in the international response and to second UK relief professionals to UN
agencies; and
a further £50m for the UN initial Flash Appeal: “Given the UK’s role in the Iraq
crisis, we cannot conceivably avoid meeting less than a 10 percent share of the
UN humanitarian appeal. My initial contribution of US$100million [£65 million]
will need quickly to be followed up to get us closer to a 10 percent share.”
338.  Ms Short added that her bid did not include any funds for reconstruction: that
would need to be considered “in the longer term”.
339.  A Treasury official advised Mr Boateng on 25 March that Ms Short’s letter “does
not really make a case in terms of actual humanitarian impact … DFID’s argument is in
essence about the need to be seen to commit funds”.199 There was little detail on how
the money would be spent.
197 United Nations, June 2003, Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq: Revised Inter‑Agency Appeal 1 April –
31 December 2003.
198 Letter Short to Boateng, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian Funding: Reserve Claim’.
199 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian Funding:
Reserve Claim’.
498
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