6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
of
‘aftermath operations’ are uncertain and are in urgent need of
clarification from US
planners at
all levels.”
Formal
planning for the southern option began on 3 January when
Maj Gen Brims, was
briefed on
the concept by PJHQ.495
Major
General Wall, Chief of Staff to the UK National
Contingent
Commander and, subsequently, GOC 1 (UK) Div, wrote that initial
planning
with the US
1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) was conducted in Atlanta in
early
January,
which enabled Maj Gen Brims to start to shape the order
of battle and build the
division as
a formation.
The
Planning and Preparation Directive was superseded by a first
version of the Execute
Directive
on 4 March 2003.
1311.
On 7
January, Mr Hoon announced the decision to deploy
additional
maritime
forces, including an amphibious capability and an order to enable
the
call‑out of
Reservists.
1312.
That was
presented as a necessary part of a policy of maintaining
the
pressure on
Saddam Hussein to persuade him to disarm. Mr Hoon stated
that
no decision
had been taken to commit UK forces to military action.
1313.
The
Government’s policy objectives for Iraq were also published
on
7 January.
1314.
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair on 3 January alerting him and other
colleagues to the
need to
take and make public decisions on the call‑out of
Reservists.496
He planned
an
announcement
to the House of Commons on 7 January as part of a broader
statement
on Iraq
strategy.
1315.
Mr Watkins
wrote to Sir David Manning later that day to inform him that
Mr Hoon
would also
want to announce the need for significant force movements,
including the
deployment
of the Amphibious Task Group.497
Mr Watkins
recorded that the MOD
had
“confirmed to the US that the Group now includes HQ 3 Commando
Brigade and
42 Commando,
together with 40 Commando as originally planned”.
1316.
Mr Straw
made a Written Ministerial Statement on the Government’s
policy
objectives
for Iraq to the House of Commons on 7 January 2003. In his later
oral
statement,
Mr Hoon commended the objectives to the House of
Commons.498
495
Report
Wall, 6 October 2003, ‘Post Operation Report – Version 2 Operation
TELIC’.
496
Letter Hoon
to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Call‑out of
Reserves’.
497
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Military
Planning and Draft Statement’.
498
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, columns 23‑25.
369