The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

806. On 29 August, Lt Gen McColl reported that Prime Minister Allawi had decided

to appoint an Iraqi Military Commander for southern Iraq – initially for Basra and

Maysan.754 The Military Commander would have command of all the ISF in the area

and be answerable to a committee in Baghdad, made up of the Prime Minister and the

Ministers of the Interior and Defence. Lt Gen McColl’s view was that there was “plenty

of scope for friction” between the local Military Commander’s HQ and those of the GOC

MND(SE), now Major General William Rollo, who was reported to be concerned about

the introduction of “another layer of approval and consultation before forces can be

deployed”.

807. On 2 September, Maj Gen Rollo reported that Prime Minister Allawi was

considering the appointment of General Rachash as Military Commander of the

South‑East. Maj Gen Rollo had concerns about Gen Rachash’s views on the need

to consult provincial Governors and the lack of legal basis for his appointment.755

On 26 September 2004, a report from Mr Robert Davies, Chief Police Adviser to the

MOI, stated that the FCO’s Overseas Security Adviser had directed UK police staff not

to travel in Snatch Land Rovers because of inadequate armour (see Section 14.1).756

Mr Davies wrote:

“This direction places a significant limitation on the deployment of our staff. The role

of mentors requires them to be able to travel frequently to see their chiefs of police.

The essence of their role and indeed, the role of the International Police Advisers,

needs them to go to the stations. The appropriate protection could be provided by

a team from the Control Risk Group, but there are insufficient numbers to meet

our requirement.”

In March 2005, DCC Smith wrote to Mr Stuart Innes, British Consul General Basra, about

travel and movement protection in Basra.757 He raised concerns that UK police officers

were subject to an “inflexible and restrictive” policy that was “likely to hamper the conduct

of work in the next 12 months”. In particular, UK police officers could only travel overland

by vehicle if accompanied by a team of bodyguards. That was during daylight hours only

and with 24 hours’ notice. However, ArmorGroup and Dyncorp officers were able to travel

by military vehicles, unaccompanied and without such tight restrictions.

DCC Smith stated that, as the policing effort moved from classroom‑based training

to mentoring and monitoring at IPS stations, officers would need more flexible travel

arrangements. He recommended that UK police officers should have the option, with

additional training if required, to operate on the same basis as the International Police

Advisers (IPAs). He also suggested supplying UK police officer secondees with enhanced

weapons, also with additional training.

754 Minute McColl to CDS and CJO, 29 August 2004, ‘Report 126 of 29 August 2004’.

755 Report Rollo to CJO, 2 September 2004, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Iraq Update – 02 September 2004’.

756 Minute Davies, 26 September 2004, ‘Weekly Report Number: 46’.

757 Minute Smith to Innes, March 2005, ‘Travel and Movement Protection – CivPol3’.

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