The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Area
of Operations (AO)” refers to
the UK military’s area of combat operations during
the
invasion of Iraq (Phase III of operations). It is the term applied
during conflict and is
the area in
which lethal force can be applied for a designated period of
time.
“Area
of Responsibility (AOR)” is a term
usually applied during peace support
operations.
In Iraq, it refers to the area of southern Iraq for which the UK
military was
responsible
during the post-conflict Occupation (Phase IV of
operations).
The two
terms were not used consistently and were sometimes applied
interchangeably
in the
same document.
1060.
On 7 January,
Mr Paul Flaherty, MOD Civil Secretary at PJHQ, set out
PJHQ’s
thoughts on
preparations for Phase IV in a minute to Mr Lee.509
In the
absence of an
agreed US
inter-agency position on Phase IV planning, the CENTCOM
commanders’
conference
in Tampa, Florida on 15 and 16 January was likely to have a
significant
impact on
US policy-making. Phase IV planning was likely to be particularly
important:
“… if, as
now appears likely, the UK were to take on the first Phase IV AOR
in
southern
Iraq. We would, in effect be setting the standard for the rest of
Phase IV
work. (And,
of course, CJO [Lt Gen Reith] is, in any case charged in CDS’
Directive
with
planning humanitarian assistance in theatre should it become
necessary.)
“From our
point of view … we have to begin thinking very soon about the
practical
consequences
on the ground of taking on the AOR. These include issues
such
as: food,
water, displaced persons, oil (including accounting for its use),
potential
Iranian incursions,
pollution as well as, in the slightly longer term, Security
Sector
Reform and
reconstruction. Some, if not all of this will of course either
determine,
or more
properly ought to be determined by, strategic considerations of
post-conflict
Iraqi
structures.”
1061.
Mr Flaherty
explained that PJHQ intended to establish a team charged
with
“developing
planning for Phase IV implementation” as soon as possible,
which
would aim
to take into account the lessons of the Balkans and Afghanistan.
PJHQ
was “in a
reasonably good position to link up with US military thinking”, but
would
need more support
from other government departments to help produce “a
fully
joined up
approach”.
509
Minute
Flaherty to DG Op Pol, 7 January 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Preparing for
Phase IV’.
292