4.4 | The search for WMD

but intended “to examine in more detail the intelligence and assessments available and

their use”.88

176. Ms Ann Taylor, the Chair of the Committee, wrote to Mr Scarlett on 8 May

requesting “JIC Assessments relating to Iraq and its WMD, dating back to August 1990

and supporting intelligence”.89

177. In its report, published in September 2003 and addressed later in this Section,

the Committee stated that it had “examined all the JIC Assessments produced since

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 1990”. The Committee had also “looked at the supporting

intelligence in critical areas to ensure that the assessments reflected the intelligence

correctly”.90

178. The discovery on 24 April of a trailer thought to be a possible mobile BW

facility attracted considerable media interest in the UK and US.

179. On 9 May, Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair that, despite the obstacles,

the initial prospects for finding evidence of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programmes

were “reasonably promising”.

180. The discovery of a suspect trailer on 24 April is addressed in the Box ‘The

investigation of possible mobile production facilities for biological agent’.

181. At the JIC meeting on 30 April, Sir Richard Dearlove “suggested that there would

need to be very careful handling of the emerging information on WMD in Iraq”. The JIC

“might find it useful to have a special meeting to discuss this in due course”.91

182. On 9 May, SIS4 sent Sir David Manning a briefing note for Mr Blair on “the current

status of efforts in Iraq to produce evidence of Saddam’s WMD programmes”.92

183. The covering letter reiterated the obstacles confronting those efforts, including

the poor security situation, the apparent disconnect between US organisations in Iraq,

the limited circle of knowledge about WMD locations and deployments, and the sheer

volume of potential sensitive sites. It was, however, a critical priority to find convincing

evidence of past WMD programmes before the deployment of the ISG.

184. The letter described the suspect BW trailer as “an encouraging find” that would be

reinforced through exploitation of other related leads in co-operation with other Coalition

officials, but one that did, however, “illustrate the difficulties of co-ordinating press lines

88 Intelligence and Security Committee, September 2003, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction –

Intelligence and Assessments, Cm5972, paragraph 10.

89 Intelligence and Security Committee, September 2003, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction –

Intelligence and Assessments, Cm5972, paragraph 12.

90 Intelligence and Security Committee, September 2003, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction –

Intelligence and Assessments, Cm5972, paragraph 16.

91 Minutes, 30 April 2003, JIC meeting.

92 Letter SIS4 to Manning, 9 May 2003, ‘WMD in Iraq’.

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