10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

“A bid for 37 additional and expert staff … was endorsed by Ministers immediately …

but staff on the ground were saddened by the absence of replacements for staff

whose contracts expired after three or six months, and because by early January,

18 of the 37 new staff had still not arrived.

“It was fortunate that both the Danish and Italian Governments chose the South in

which to concentrate their contributions to the Coalition’s efforts. For some months

we had more officials here from these countries – 13 each – than from the UK.”

921.  Sir Hilary commented on his request for 37 additional staff in his evidence to the

Inquiry:

“I was sent the record of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee [of 28 August] … and

it was recorded there that Synnott should be provided with everything he thought

was necessary. That, to my mind, clearly came from Number 10 … The difficulty,

however, was turning that political imperative into reality.

“To me, there was a distinct absence of machinery to make things happen, the

translation from policy to practice. Otherwise it became hope.”529

922.  The deployment of UK civilian personnel is considered in more detail in

Section 15.1.

923.  Sir Hilary paid a farewell call on Mr Straw on 11 February.530 Sir Hilary told

Mr Straw that he had been frustrated at the length of time it had taken the FCO to

deploy people and provide secure communications. The FCO’s response had compared

unfavourably with that of other departments.

924.  The FCO’s response to that criticism is described in Section 15.1.

925.  Sir Hilary described progress on the Essential Services Plan (which had been

agreed in September) in his memoir:

“The [Plan] become one of the highlights of the Coalition’s reconstruction activity

in the South. Its concentration on small-scale projects rendered it doable and

allowed for flexibility if obstacles should arise, which of course they did. It proved

feasible to proceed with and protect small projects, even in a deteriorating security

environment. And, since local people could readily see that they would benefit from

the projects’ completion, they actively helped maintain security …”531

529  Public hearing, 9 December 2009, pages 15 and 45.

530  Minute Owen to PS/PUS [FCO], 12 February 2004, ‘FCO Response to Iraq’.

531  Synnott H. Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq. I B Tauris & Co

Ltd., 2008.

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