The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
461.
Mr Asquith
ended with the recommendation that the UK effort be seen in
context:
“After the
US we have the largest investment and the largest presence. Others
look
to us for
direction. A major reduction in our resources risks being
misunderstood
as a signal
of reduced commitment. Every prospective six months has been
billed
as a key
period. But we have between now and next spring a clutch of
determining
events: the
Baghdad Security Plan, constitutional review, oil law,
amnesty,
de‑Ba’athification,
provincial elections, International Compact, security transition
…
I will
continue to evaluate the risk and the level of
resources.”
462.
In his
response to Mr Asquith on 9 October, Sir Peter Ricketts
concluded:
“… you …
are right to underline the importance that is attached here to your
teams’
work. But
your staff’s safety must remain our paramount concern. Please do
tell us
immediately
if you ever feel you are being pressured to take a risk with which
you
or your
OSMs are uncomfortable.” 305
463.
Participants
at the Inquiry’s civilian outreach event commented that, by that
time,
London had
an insatiable appetite for updates on progress, which, it was
understood,
had to be
positive. They described a tension between reporting the situation
as it was
and
maintaining morale.
464.
On 22
September 2006, a US contractor working for the State Department
was
killed when
a rocket hit non‑hardened US accommodation on the Basra Palace
site.306
The attack
was the fourth on the compound in four days.
465.
The IPU
advised that, although all UK accommodation was hardened, it
should
not be
considered mortar or rocket proof. During September, the proportion
of rounds
landing or
exploding inside the compound had increased. The IPU reported that
steps
had already
been taken to reduce staff exposure to the increased threat,
including
extended
breaks from Basra. In view of the latest attack, it had had asked
Dr Marsden
to review
those steps again and consider the scope for further
drawdown.
466.
DFID officials
sent advice in parallel to Mr Benn.307
467.
At DOP(I) on
12 October, Ministers expressed concern that the security
situation
in Basra
meant UK staff were “in danger, and unable to function
effectively”.308
There
was “a
serious question mark over whether or not HMG had the right to ask
them to stay
305
Letter
Ricketts to Asquith, 9 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Post
Security’.
306
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Foreign Secretary, 22 September 2006, ‘Iraq:
Basra Palace Compound:
Security’.
307
Minute
MENAD [junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 22
September 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra –
Security
Incident’.
308
Minutes, 12
October 2006, DOP(I).
326