6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
Iraq’s
future, including much of its oil reserves, critical communications
nodes, a
city
(Basra) of 1.3m people and a port (Umm Qasr) about the size of
Southampton.
Although
the establishment of UK control over this area will require
careful
presentation
to rebut any allegations of selfish motives, we will be playing a
vital role
in shaping
a better future for Iraq and its people.”
1128.
Mr Hoon stated
that he had put work in hand to address the “three big
issues”
identified
by Mr Blair at the meeting with the Chiefs of Staff:
•
The “nature
of the proposition” that was being put “to the Iraqi people
including
those in
the governing apparatus who are not considered beyond the pale,
and
the way in
which that would be conveyed to them without damaging
operational
security
and losing the element of surprise”.
•
The need
“Now that we have a proposed Area of Responsibility” to work on
that
“with
greater clarity”. The forthcoming visit of a Whitehall team to
Washington
was
identified as “an opportunity to mould US thinking”.
•
Making sure
the UK had the “best possible contingency plans for
worst-case
scenarios”.
1129.
On timing, Mr
Hoon stated:
“CENTCOM
assume that, unless Saddam changes his behaviour, a political
decision
to take
military action may be made in mid-February. Air and ground
operations
could begin
in early March, with the main effort by ground forces beginning
in
mid-March
(although they still aspire to bring the main effort
forward).”
1130.
Mr Hoon
recommended that the UK:
“… should
inform the US that we agree that planning should assume the
contribution
of the
proposed UK land force package to carry out the role the US has
requested,
subject
to:
i the
overall caveat that a further political decision would be required
to
commit UK
forces to any specific operation;
ii US
assistance in facilitating the bed-down of UK forces, and provision
of
logistic
support;
iii further
work to develop a satisfactory plan for the
aftermath.”
1131.
Mr Hoon
highlighted the significance of the post-conflict phase
of
operations
in his advice to Mr Blair, but he did not:
•
identify
the risks associated with deploying UK forces before
decisions
had been
made on the scope or duration of their post-conflict role, or
on
the UK’s
wider post-conflict responsibilities;
303