The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
180.
The Chiefs of
Staff were considering what the “maximum effort” UK
contribution
could be
for a UK ground force operating as part of a larger US force in
northern Iraq.
The
“illustrative” force package consisted of a divisional HQ, an
armoured brigade, an air
assault
brigade and a logistics brigade. A decision to commit all those
elements would
comprise
some 40,000 personnel (including up to 10,000
Reservists).81
181.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office wrote to Mr Lee on 9 September, reporting
that Mr Hoon
had spoken
to Mr Blair on the evening of 8 September following
Mr Blair’s return from
Camp
David:
“It was
agreed that a full UK Divisional contribution was impracticable and
the UK
should play
down our ability to take on an overall leadership role in the
North. The
UK should,
however, remain involved, developing the enhanced support
package
with the
addition of a land medium scale contribution.”82
182.
Mr Hoon
requested that planning should continue. His Private Office added:
“For
now actions
must remain invisible … and this situation is likely to last for
about a month.”
183.
MOD
officials continued to push for agreement to discuss UORs with a
wider
set of
colleagues and the Treasury.
184.
The MOD
sought approval from Mr Hoon to progress 16 “showstoppers”
but
highlighted
that there was also a number of urgent UORs that were necessary
to
bring a UK
force up to full operational capacity.
185.
On
4 September, in advance of a planned meeting with
Mr Hoon, Mr William Nye,
Head of the
Treasury Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence Team, briefed
Mr Gordon
Brown,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, that MOD officials had done little
work to refine
the cost
estimates for preparing a medium and large scale force, as they
were under
no pressure
from Ministers to do so.83
Neither had
the MOD done any work to assess
the cost of
the campaign itself. Mr Nye said that it would be useful for
Mr Brown to
emphasise
that the Treasury needed to be involved in some of the discussions
on
military
planning, to enable it “to be kept informed of the context of
financial and
strategic decisions”.
186.
The Treasury
informed the Inquiry that the meeting between Mr Brown
and
Mr Hoon
was one-to-one and no record was taken.84
187.
A minute from
Mr Watkins to Mr Lee on 5 September summarised a
series of
discussions
that Mr Hoon had had earlier that day.85
In a
meeting with Mr Brown,
81
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
82
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to DG Op Pol, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Defence
Secretary’s Conversation
with the
Prime Minister’.
83
Minute Nye
to Bowman, 4 September 2002, ‘Meeting with Geoff Hoon:
Iraq’.
84
Email
Treasury to Iraq Inquiry Secretariat, 26 February 2010,
[untitled].
85
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
28