9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
911.
On 14 June,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told Mr Blair:
“The US are
… focused on the Anbar model, but this is creating real tension
with
Maliki.
Violence continues to be down in Anbar, but the motivations of the
tribes
remain
unclear, and they continue to express their opposition to the
Government
of Iraq.
Nor do they tie in to any convincing, wider, Sunni leadership …
Maliki
is … coming
under pressure from other Shia over the creation of a
well‑armed
Sunni
militia, particularly as the US now propose to extend the model to
areas
of Baghdad …
“The
Pentagon this week also released its now regular quarterly report
on progress
in Iraq.
This noted that overall levels of violence in the country had not
decreased
since the
start of the surge, noted that the GoI’s delivery had been
‘uneven’, and that
it had made
‘little progress’ on the political front – reconciliation was
described as a
‘serious
unfulfilled objective’.”497
912.
The Pentagon
report referred to named Basra as “Partially Ready for
Transition”,
in the
same category as Wasit, Qadisiyah, Babil, Karbala, Baghdad, Diyala,
Salah ad
Din, Tamim
and Ninawa.498
Only Anbar
was marked “Not Ready for Transition”.
913.
On 17 June,
the US military led a Corps‑level strike operation in Maysan
Province
targeting
Iranian‑affiliated militants.499
914.
Maj Gen Shaw
expressed concern beforehand about the need to be seen
to
respect
Iraqi sovereignty, the acceptable level of collateral damage and
the way the
operation
would be presented. Despite the US going “some way to addressing
the
GOC’s
concerns”, the operation went ahead with no Iraqi participation. It
was unclear
whether the
Governor of Maysan had been informed ahead of the
operation.
915.
The MND(SE)
weekly report stated: “The outcome was a degree of
opprobrium
levelled at
British Forces who were blamed erroneously not only for
participating directly
in the raid
but also for having done so without legitimate authority in
violation of the
PIC MOU.”
916.
Lt Gen Lamb
considered that the response of the Iraqi Government and
security
forces to
the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque contrasted positively with
their responses
in
2006.500
The Iraqi
Government had moved quickly to intervene, to establish a
curfew
and, across
the political divide, to denounce the attacks.
917.
The positive
response was counterbalanced by the fact that the number
of
attacks
across Iraq remained high and had “broken the 200 per day mark this
week”.
497
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 14 June 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 14
June’.
498
Report to
Congress, June 2007, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, page
29.
499
Minute
Thomas to CJO, 22 June 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update
– 22 June 2007’.
500
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 17 June 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (257) 17 June
07’.
171