9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
[Contingency
Operating Base] … (b) transfer to the US responsibility for
training and
mentoring
14 Division and providing the QRF [Quick Reaction Force]
…
“Both
options carry major disadvantages. Neither would be at all
attractive to the US.
We would be
asking them to make a substantial additional investment in
southern
Iraq … We
could not present a coherent military rationale for either
alternative …”
215.
The author
advised that the longer term damage to the UK’s military, defence
and
security
reputation and interests in the US would be “considerable”
because:
“Both
Washington and General Petraeus believe they have a commitment from
us
that we
will stay the course until 14 Division has been fully trained.
These options
require the
US to share the burden and will be seen as the UK reneging on a
deal …
“There
would be similar reputational consequences in Iraq and
regionally.
Domestically
we could not present a credible military case for the reduction
nor
argue that
it is conditions-based. Our contribution would be portrayed as a
token sop
and would
be especially difficult to explain if we began to take casualties.
We should
expect an
adverse and long-lasting impact on morale across Defence. Option
(b),
which would
involve UK forces withdrawing into the COB while US troops took
over
our tasks
in Basra, would be especially toxic to the Army’s morale and
reputation.”
216.
Mr Brown,
Mr Browne and ACM Stirrup met Gen Petraeus (who had recently
been
appointed
Commander in Chief US Central Command) on 29
September.78
Briefing
for
Mr Brown
stressed the importance of ensuring that Gen Petraeus understood
that the
UK’s plans
for drawdown in Iraq had Mr Brown’s backing, and were not just
contingent
military
planning. It was equally important that Gen Petraeus realised that
“UK drawdown
in Iraq
will not translate to a scaling-up in Afghanistan”.
217.
In their
discussion, Gen Petraeus paid tribute to UK forces in Iraq: work
to
capitalise
on operations in Basra, Baghdad and mentoring the Iraqi
headquarters had
all been
“superb”.79
No
discussion of drawdown was recorded in the note of the
meeting.
Mr Browne
was reported to have “questioned whether Iraq had the right
Constitution”.
218.
On 13 October,
an interview with Prime Minister Maliki appeared in
The
Times.80
He was
reported to have said that at their current strength (4,100),
British troops were
“definitely
… no longer necessary”. The tasks he envisaged for British military
trainers
did not
warrant a deployment of anything like that scale. Prime Minister
Maliki also
78
Briefing
No.10 [junior officials] to Brown, 29 September 2008, ‘Visit of
General David Petraeus,
Monday 29
September’.
79
Letter
Catsaras to Thorneloe, 30 September 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with General Petraeus,
29 September’.
80
The
Times, 13
October 2008, Thank You,
and Goodbye.
417