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8  |  The invasion
562.  Gen Jackson agreed, adding that “the desire to draw down in accordance with
departmental assumptions could run counter to the UK’s moral responsibility to Iraq”.
563.  The minutes of the meeting recorded that there were “a significant number
of Phase IV papers in circulation, with more in prospect”. Adm Boyce instructed
Lt Gen Pigott to update the planning guidance and Mr Lee to provide Ministers with
a summary of Phase IV issues and progress with planning by 1 April.
564.  Mr Drummond briefed Sir David Manning that the Chiefs of Staff discussion had:
“… led on to thinking that Phase IVa might be much longer than expected and
the need to consider longer term military options. The Chiefs are still determined
to reduce by 10,000 or so by the autumn. (No harm in thinking this through now,
but there is a lot that can change …).” 339
565.  Admiral Sir Alan West, Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, commented on
the draft Operational Concept on 27 March. He registered concern about “mission creep
and the possibility of taking on too many provinces bearing in mind the forces available”
and requested a discussion in a COS(I) [Chiefs of Staff (Informal)] meeting after a
regular meeting of the Chiefs of Staff.340
566.  On 28 March, Gen Jackson commented that some of the assumptions in the draft
Operational Concept about levels of consent and the extent to which the UK could use
the remnants of the Iraqi administration “may have been optimistic”.341 The aspiration
to draw down to a divisional headquarters and one brigade remained, but “the situation
may demand more of us”. He recommended that “we should be prepared to constantly
review our assumptions and the deductions they lead to, and we should approach
detailed plans with caution until we can be sure they are robust”.
567.  The Chiefs of Staff discussed the draft Operational Concept for Phase IV and
the size of the UK military contribution to Phase IV, on 31 March.342
568.  In discussion, the Chiefs of Staff commented that Lt Gen McKiernan “had
established that the force level requirement for the region would be three manoeuvre
brigades and an aviation brigade in reserve, implying a potential UK commitment
significantly in excess of ‘a medium scale effort by autumn 03’.” Although operational
conditions were likely to be different in each province, “it was likely that any extension of
UK responsibility beyond Basra province would only be possible with support from other
Coalition partners”.
339  Minute Drummond to Manning, 26 March 2003, ‘Chiefs Meeting’.
340  Minute NA/1SL to MA/CJO, 27 March 2003, ‘OP TELIC Phase IV – The Joint Commander’s Draft
Operational Concept’.
341  Minute MA2/CGS to MA/CJO, 28 March 2003, ‘An Operational Concept for Phase IV’.
342  Minutes, 31 March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
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