8 | The
invasion
562.
Gen Jackson
agreed, adding that “the desire to draw down in accordance
with
departmental
assumptions could run counter to the UK’s moral responsibility to
Iraq”.
563.
The minutes of
the meeting recorded that there were “a significant
number
of Phase IV
papers in circulation, with more in prospect”. Adm Boyce
instructed
Lt Gen Pigott
to update the planning guidance and Mr Lee to provide
Ministers with
a summary
of Phase IV issues and progress with planning by 1
April.
564.
Mr Drummond
briefed Sir David Manning that the Chiefs of Staff discussion
had:
“… led on
to thinking that Phase IVa might be much longer than expected
and
the need to
consider longer term military options. The Chiefs are still
determined
to reduce
by 10,000 or so by the autumn. (No harm in thinking this through
now,
but there
is a lot that can change …).” 339
565.
Admiral Sir
Alan West, Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, commented
on
the draft
Operational Concept on 27 March. He registered concern about
“mission creep
and the
possibility of taking on too many provinces bearing in mind the
forces available”
and
requested a discussion in a COS(I) [Chiefs of Staff (Informal)]
meeting after a
regular
meeting of the Chiefs of Staff.340
566.
On 28 March,
Gen Jackson commented that some of the assumptions in the
draft
Operational
Concept about levels of consent and the extent to which the UK
could use
the
remnants of the Iraqi administration “may have been
optimistic”.341
The
aspiration
to draw
down to a divisional headquarters and one brigade remained, but
“the situation
may demand
more of us”. He recommended that “we should be prepared to
constantly
review our
assumptions and the deductions they lead to, and we should
approach
detailed
plans with caution until we can be sure they are
robust”.
567.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed the draft Operational Concept for Phase IV
and
the size
of the UK military contribution to Phase IV, on 31
March.342
568.
In discussion,
the Chiefs of Staff commented that Lt Gen McKiernan
“had
established
that the force level requirement for the region would be three
manoeuvre
brigades
and an aviation brigade in reserve, implying a potential UK
commitment
significantly
in excess of ‘a medium scale effort by autumn 03’.” Although
operational
conditions
were likely to be different in each province, “it was likely that
any extension of
UK
responsibility beyond Basra province would only be possible with
support from other
Coalition
partners”.
339
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 26 March 2003, ‘Chiefs Meeting’.
340
Minute
NA/1SL to MA/CJO, 27 March 2003, ‘OP TELIC Phase IV – The Joint
Commander’s Draft
Operational
Concept’.
341
Minute
MA2/CGS to MA/CJO, 28 March 2003, ‘An Operational Concept for Phase
IV’.
342
Minutes, 31
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
101