3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
to pursue
a prosperous life within a safe environment”. The UK’s first
objective
was
disarmament, but the “next priority would be to work with the
United Nations
to help the
Iraqi people recover … and allow their country to move towards
one
that is
ruled by law, respects international obligations and provides
effective
and representative
government”.
•
Control of
Iraq’s oil was not the motivation for action. The
mission was
disarmament.
Iraq’s oilfields would be protected from any acts of
environmental
terrorism,
and the revenue generated would be used to benefit the Iraqi
people.
•
The UK was
not guilty of double standards in relation to the
conflict
between Israel
and Palestine. The UK was
“working tirelessly” to achieve the
implementation
of UN Security Council resolutions in respect of
Israel/Palestine;
a conflict
that had “long provided terrorists with a convenient rallying
point”. As
long as
that dispute was unresolved, collective security would “remain
elusive”.
254.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that the UK wanted to delay
tabling
a resolution
until after a special European Council which would take
place
on 17 February.
255.
The US
continued to resist UK proposals for a draft resolution
containing
either an
ultimatum to Saddam to leave or a timetable for a
decision.
256.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell spoke three times on 11 February.
257.
In the first
conversation, they discussed US reservations about
including
an ultimatum
in the resolution and the timing of a draft.72
258.
Following a
discussion with Mr Blair, Mr Straw telephoned Secretary
Powell to set
out
concerns that tabling a resolution before the European Council
would be interpreted
as
pre-empting the meeting.73
Mr Straw
stated that the “critical thing” on both timing and
content
would be “what tactically was most likely to ensure nine votes and
no veto”.
He had
asked Sir Jeremy Greenstock for a menu of options.
259.
Secretary
Powell had asked whether Mr Blair really wanted an
ultimatum
in the resolution;
it might be better for it to be delivered personally by President
Bush
or Mr Blair.
260.
The record of
the FCO Iraq evening meeting on 11 February reported that
Mr Blair
and
Mr Straw had agreed that the UK would run with the text of a
draft resolution agreed
72
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 11 February 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with Colin Powell,
11 February’.
73
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 11 February 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Second
Conversation with
Colin Powell,
11 February’.
227