15.1 | Civilian
personnel
from the
Basra Palace site would mean closing the UK base at PJCC, and so
halting
SSR work
and losing “situational intelligence within Basra
City”.
522.
The UK
military handed over the PJCC to Iraqi control on 26
August.345
The Basra
Palace site followed on 2 September. Over 5,000 UK military, the
British
Embassy
Office, the Basra PRT and the US Regional Embassy Office were now
located
at the
COB.
523.
In December
2007, FCO Iraq Group reviewed the status of the British
Embassy
Office
Erbil.346
Mr Frank
Baker, Head of Iraq Group, advised Dr John Jenkins,
FCO
Director
Middle East and North Africa, that the British Embassy Office
should remain
at the
Khanzad Hotel despite concerns about security and value for money.
Mr Baker
explained
that the Khanzad office achieved a score well inside the “red zone”
on the
FCO risk
matrix. Staff in Erbil would continue to look for better short‑term
alternatives
while
preparing the business case for a long‑term presence in
Erbil.
524.
Dr Jenkins
advised Dr Kim Howells, Minister of State for the Middle East,
and
Sir Peter
Ricketts that it was “a tough call” whether to remain in
Erbil:
“There is a
serious duty of care issue. The costs of maintaining the consulate
in
Erbil flow
from this. On the other hand it does a serious job of work. The
French are
looking to
establish a mission there. My view is that we should accept the
current
level of
risk and maintain our presence while actively looking for other
sites (which
may include
co‑location with the French).”
525.
In the first
week of December, Sir Peter Ricketts visited Baghdad
and
Basra with
Mr Bill Jeffrey, the MOD PUS, and Ms Susan Wardell, DFID
Director
526.
On his return
to London, Sir Peter advised Mr Miliband that the most
important
issue to
resolve was the future of the UK presence in Basra. Mr Brown,
now
Prime Minister,
had announced a continued UK military presence until late 2008
and
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff, intended
that the UK
military
should leave soon after that. Mr Brown had also set a high
level of ambition for
the UK
contribution to economic regeneration, but the UK civilian presence
was entirely
dependent
on the military for security and life support. Sir Peter
warned: “If the military
go, the
civilians go, unless another very capable western military force
replaces us.”
He also
warned that the Basra PRT was small and there was “a sense of
planning blight”
because of
uncertainties beyond late 2008.
345
eGram
36335/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 4 September 2007, ‘Basra: British
Forces Hand Over
the Final
Base in Basra City’.
346
Minute
Baker to Howells, 5 December 2007, ‘Erbil: Consulate
General’.
347
Minute
Ricketts to Foreign Secretary, 10 December 2007, ‘Visit to
Iraq’.
337