3.4 | Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002

be much greater than the advantages. He thought most Arab and EU countries

would agree.”

• The Security Council “could be seized. If so, France would be ready to discuss

options. France would not be alone in the possible use of its veto.”

343. Mr Blair told President Chirac that Saddam Hussein had to know that this was “his

last chance to co‑operate”. It would be:

“… difficult to persuade the US to go down the UN path unless they believed that

a refusal by Saddam to abide by his UN obligations would result in some damage

to him.”

344. Mr Blair added:

“… he understood the French position: support for a UNSCR on inspectors, no

support for unilateral military action, and ready to discuss UN S[ecurity] C[ouncil]

measures if Saddam refused to comply.”

345. President Chirac:

“… confirmed that that was his position. He recognised that maximum pressure

was needed on Saddam. Saddam understood that he faced a choice: inspectors

or attack. The problem was that he always took stupid decisions. So Chirac was

worried. And worse was Cheney’s talk about military action whatever Saddam did

on inspections, which gave Saddam no incentive to accept inspectors. There were

imbeciles on both sides.”

346. Mr Blair “agreed to report back” to President Chirac after his discussions with

President Bush.

347. Mr Blair met Dr Blix on 6 September.110

348. The record stated that Dr Blix told Mr Blair that Iraq was continuing to insist on

a comprehensive settlement, which would link lifting the No‑Fly Zones, removing the

US threat, lifting sanctions, and establishing a zone free of WMD. The threat of military

action had led to Iraq weakening its position but Iraq would not move to allow inspectors

back in if it thought that military action was inevitable or if they thought there was no

prospect of military action. They would move if they saw a link between a move and

avoiding military action. Mr Blair said that he thought there was such a link but the

inspection regime would have to be tough.

110 Letter Rycroft to Sedwill, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Hans Blix,

6 September’.

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