The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
242.
Ministers
did not seek, and were not given, considered
inter-departmental
advice on
the implications of the decision.
243.
Nor,
despite it being a decision which was likely to have major
implications
for the UK
lasting many years, was there a collective Ministerial discussion
before
the
decision was taken.
244.
Nor was
Cabinet informed of the proposals and given an opportunity
to
discuss
them before the decision was announced.
245.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that he had advised Mr Hoon, in either
late
December
2002 or early January 2003, that it would be timely to take stock
of UK
policy in
the light of concerns, including:
•
uncertainties
about whether it would be possible to agree a second
resolution;
•
the need to
push the UK conditions;
•
the impact
on the US/UK strategic relationship if the UK did not act
with
the
US;
•
the
implications of a bigger military role in the South;
and
•
planning
for post-conflict Iraq was not robust.
246.
Sir Kevin
also stated that he had advised Mr Hoon that he should seek a
full
Ministerial
discussion of the issues.
247.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit’s private minute to Mr Hoon on 14 January, drawing out
how
the US
“would react if HMG failed to go along with the United States in
the event that
they
decided to use military force against Iraq without a further
enabling UNSCR”,
is
addressed earlier in this Section.79
248.
Sir Kevin told
the Inquiry in December 2009 that:
“… by … the
end of 2002 – when it is becoming clear that the northern option
wasn’t
going to
work and we might take a bigger role in the South, and, therefore,
the
stakes for
the UK would be greater, at that stage it wasn’t entirely clear
whether
we were
going to achieve all of our conditions …
“I
certainly discussed these issues very fully with … [Mr Hoon] as to
whether this
was indeed
the right point to take broader stock of where we were going and
make
absolutely
certain that the Government was satisfied with the course. Not to
say
that I
wasn’t, it is just [to say] that I felt it was quite important for
Ministers to be
absolutely
clear … what the prospects might be.”80
79
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: What
If?’.
80
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 80-81.
420