3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
new
government has to be stable; and we can move forward in time
…
There must
be as little as possible vested interest in
resistance.
(vi) We
need to be sure the military plan is viable. I need a meeting on
this
and our
military’s assurance that the plan can work. This is no
small
undertaking.
(vii) We
must strive to move the MEPP forward …
(viii) We
have got to show sensitivity to any humanitarian fall‑out from
war.
Britain
should take the lead on this, working with the UN.”
421.
Mr Blair
believed it would be “sensible to go to Washington late January in
order to
finalise
the strategy”.
422.
There is no
evidence that Mr Blair had seen Mr Straw’s minute of 3
January or
Sir David
Manning’s minute of the same day before he wrote his note of 4
January.
423.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote that, in December 2002 and during a short
winter
break in
January 2003, he had “tried to work out what was the right thing to
do”. He was:
“… past
expediency, past political calculation, past personal
introspection. I knew
this could
be the end politically. I just wanted to know: what is the right
thing?
“I could
see by now … that barring something unanticipated, the likelihood
was war.
We could
opt out … I was sure … and stay out of the conflict, coming in only
for
the aftermath.
We had many allies by then. Thirteen out of 25 EU countries
were
onside …
But many were taking the route of avoiding the initial
fighting.”150
424.
At Chequers
over Christmas 2002, he had asked himself:
“What did I
truly believe? That Saddam was about to attack Britain or the
US?
No. That
he was a bigger WMD threat than Iran or North Korea or Libya? Not
really,
though he
was the only leader to have used them. That left alone now, with
these
inspections
ending the same way as the last, he would threaten the stability
of
the region?
Very possibly. That he would leach WMD material or provide help
to
terrorists?
Yes … Was it better for his people to be rid of him? For sure.
Could it be
done
without a long and bloody war? You can never be sure of that. Did I
want more
time? Yes,
but to allow me to probe every other way of doing it, rather than
because
I believed
the nature of his regime would ever change. Would a new Iraq help
build
a new
Middle East? I thought that was possible.
“Did I
think that if we drew back now, we would have to deal with him
later? … yes,
there was
no other way that this man with his past was going to be anything
other
than a
source of instability. At some point, especially if strengthened
now, he would
be back to
his old tricks.
150
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
77