The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

105. Mr Wood’s letter incorporating instructions for Lord Goldsmith was sent to

Ms Adams on 9 December 2002, with a copy to Mr Martin Hemming, the MOD Legal

Adviser.28 It briefly described the provisions of resolution 1441, the history of the

negotiation and adoption of resolution 1441 and subsequent developments, and

the legal background.

106. Mr Wood wrote:

“The main legal issue raised by the resolution … is whether a further decision by the

Security Council would be required before force could lawfully be used to ensure

Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. (This question is often put in the

form ‘Is a second resolution required?’, but a further decision by the Council could

take other forms, in particular it could be a statement made on behalf of the Council

or its members.)”

107. Describing resolution 1441 as a “consensus text” and stating that, “as is often the

case, the drafting leaves something to be desired”, Mr Wood wrote (paragraph 5 of his

letter) that there were two broad views of the interpretation of resolution 1441:

• the first was that resolution 1441 “does not authorise the use of force or revive the

Council’s earlier authorisation; a further Council decision is needed for that”; and

• the second was that “taking account of previous Council practice, the negotiating

history and the statements made on adoption”, resolution 1441 “can be read as

meaning that the Council has already conditionally authorised the use of force

against Iraq; the conditions being (a) that Iraq fails to take the final opportunity

if it has been offered and (b) that there is Council discussion (not necessarily

a decision) under paragraph 12 of the resolution. If these conditions are met,

the material breach is uncovered and (on the ‘revival of authorisation’ argument

based on Security Council resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991)) force can be

taken to be authorised under SCR 1441.”

The UK justification for the use of military force against Iraq in 1993 and in December

1998 (Operation Desert Fox) relied on the concept that the use of force authorised in

resolution 678 (1990) could be “revived” by a Security Council determination that Iraq was

in “material breach” of the cease-fire provisions in resolution 687 (1991).

Resolution 678, adopted on 29 November 1990, demanded:

“… that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) [which required its immediate

withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent resolutions”; and

“unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully” implemented those resolutions,

authorised:

28 Letter Wood to Adams, 9 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)’.

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