The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
losses. But
when it came to leaving the Palace completely, Dr Rice said
she
hesitated:
the situation was too delicate to predict; a spike in unrest in
Basra would
be most
unwelcome … Hadley said he hoped there would be no
announcement
about
departure before the Prime Minister and President discussed Iraq
when they
met at the
end of the month.”49
113.
On 17 July,
Mr McDonald sent a minute to Mr Brown in advance of the
planned
NSID(OD)
meeting on 19 July.50
He
explained that when Ministers agreed in February
that in
principle the military should withdraw from Basra Palace, it had
been assumed
that a
residual presence would be retained at the Warren site to maintain
situational
awareness
and to continue training and mentoring. As the FCO and MOD
paper
explained,
the deteriorating security situation meant that it would no longer
be possible
to do that.
Accordingly, the UK’s ability to re-intervene successfully if
required would be
“greatly
diminished”.
114.
Although the
previous planning assumption had been for a significant UK
presence
in MND(SE)
for most of 2008, Mr McDonald wrote:
“… given
the serious questions about our ability to deliver either security
or
significant
training or mentoring programmes post-PIC in Basra, those
assumptions
now look
unrealistic. And the significant risks to our forces are likely to
outweigh the
security or
other benefits derived from keeping them in Iraq. In these
circumstances,
there is a
case for planning for the withdrawal of the majority of British
troops from
Southern
Iraq to a much more rapid timetable.”
115.
Mr McDonald
argued that if the UK withdrew from Basra City in August as
planned,
very
shortly afterwards there would be a need to explain to the US that
UK would be
withdrawing
from MND(SE) altogether in spring 2008, meaning that “we would hit
the US
with
unwelcome news twice at a politically sensitive time”.
116.
Alternatively,
if the UK were to delay withdrawal until September, it would
be
possible to
present both “unwelcome message[s]” to the US
simultaneously.
117.
The NSID(OD)
meeting planned for 19 July was cancelled and was not
118.
A report sent
to Lt Gen Houghton on 19 July said that Gen Mohan had given
an
expanded
version of his MNCS presentation to a specially convened meeting of
the
Crisis
Action Cell.52
This group
usually focused exclusively on Baghdad security and
was
chaired by
Dr Rubaie.
49
Letter
McDonald to Hayes, 19 July 2007, ‘Dinner with US Secretary of State
and National Security
Adviser: 17
July’.
50
Minute
McDonald to Prime Minister, 17 July 2007, ‘Iraq Transition in
Basra: Meeting of NSID(OD),
19th July’.
51
Note
Cabinet Office, 11 February 2010 [sic], ‘Cancellation
Note’.
52
Minute
Berragan to CJO, 19 July 2007, ‘MNC-I Update – 19 Jul
07’.
206