3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
836.
Sir Jeremy
commented that: “Positions remain generally unchanged” but
the
co‑sponsors
had produced a “more effective line of argument than the
opposition”.
837.
Following the
meeting, details emerged of a letter from Iraq to Dr Blix
confirming
“agreement
‘in principle’ to the destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles”. Sir
Jeremy reported
that he had
“tried to discount it in advance with the Council”. If Iraq’s
“acceptance ‘in
principle’”
did not turn into concrete destruction before 1 March, which Sir
Jeremy
thought
“unlikely”, that would be “a bonus”.
838.
Dr Blix
told the UK Mission that he could and would make the
“clusters”
document
available for the Council meeting on 7 March. But preparation of
the
work
programme and key remaining tasks would not be ready by
then.
839.
Dr Blix
lunched with EU Heads of Mission in New York on 28
February.255
840.
The UK Mission
reported that Dr Blix had made a number of points
including:
•
Iraq “had
not actively co-operated until recently”. It was now
producing
documents,
a list of participants in destruction activities in 1991, and
digging
up R-400
bombs. But Iraq had not started to disarm, the picture on
interviews
was
“disappointing”, and the flow of documents was
“limited”.
•
He shared
the US view that it “was for Iraq to declare its WMD holdings
and
show how it
was disarming”. UNMOVIC was not a detective agency. There
was
plenty Iraq
could do to address allegations which were well known to
Baghdad,
such as
checkpoints for trucks and an inventory of underground
facilities.
•
Iraq could
have acted earlier. Iraq was not co-operating fully and
actively.
Full co-operation
should not take a long time. If UNMOVIC secured full
co‑operation,
“verification would take neither years nor weeks but
months”.
•
There had
been no change of heart, just more activity. Iraq had
attempted
to conceal
things.
•
The debate
was “somewhat over-focused on the outstanding questions
identified
by UNSCOM”.
It was not possible to prove a negative (Iraq’s claim that it had
not
resumed any
WMD programmes): “But Iraq could certainly make the
negative
plausible
(e.g. producing documents; opening underground facilities).” It
could
“certainly
do more on interviews”.
•
He thought
there was increasing acceptance in the Council that he
should
circulate
UNMOVIC’s clusters of unresolved questions. But UNMOVIC
should
not “grade”
Iraq’s co-operation; that was “the responsibility of the
Council”.
But producing
the document would facilitate Iraq’s task.
•
He did not
think he was bound to deliver the work programme
required
by
resolution 1284 “only on 27 March”. It would be “fairly short”, but
the
Commissioners
had still to take a view.
255
Email
Thomson to Greenstock, 1 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Blix’.
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