The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
135.
On 6 May,
President Bush announced the appointment of Ambassador
Paul
Bremer as
the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and head of the CPA (see Section
9.1).105
The CPA
quickly subsumed ORHA, retaining many of its staff.106
136.
Within the
CPA, Ambassador Bremer’s Senior Adviser for National Security
and
Defense was
Mr Walt Slocombe.107
A former
New York City Police Commissioner,
Mr Bernard
Kerik, became the CPA’s senior adviser to the MOI.
137.
On 6 May,
Mr Straw announced to Parliament that Mr John Sawers had
been
appointed
as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on
Iraq:
“Mr Sawers
will work alongside Chris Segar, head of the newly opened British
office
in Baghdad,
particularly in relation to the political process and our work in
the Office
of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.” 108
138.
On 8 May the
AHMGIR discussed a paper on SSR produced by the
IPU.109
The paper
stated:
“Reform
across the full range of security activities (armed forces,
intelligence
agencies,
justice and law enforcement institutions) is an essential element
of the
overall
Coalition strategy to establish a united and representative Iraqi
Government
and to
create the conditions under which the Coalition can eventually
disengage.
“The
objective must be the transformation of Iraq’s security
institutions so that
they play
an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in
providing
external
and internal security for Iraq’s citizens … UK experience suggests
that
a coherent
strategy will need effective burden sharing and … the
extended
involvement
of NGOs and other SSR actors. Immediate decisions and urgent
action
is needed
to deal with the potential problems of unemployed and disaffected
military
and
security service personnel.”
139.
The paper
described the US approach as “embryonic” and assessed that it
“tends
to approach
elements of the security sector separately”. It also stated that
“we must
recognise
that influencing US views may prove difficult, and will undoubtedly
require
considerable
and sustained effort”.
140.
The paper
reported that Mr Slocombe was assembling a team to deploy to
Iraq
later that
month to establish the “Office of the Senior Advisor for the
Ministry of Defence
Iraq and
the Iraqi National Defence Force”. He was reported to be “actively
seeking
105
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
106
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
107
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
108
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 6 May
2003, column 515.
109
Paper IPU,
May 2003, ‘Iraq – Security Sector Reform’; Minutes, 8 May 2003, Ad
Hoc Group on Iraq
Rehabilitation
meeting.
92