3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
Dr Blix
would circulate the “clusters” document to the Security
Council
on 7 March,
but the work programme would not be ready.
•
Dr Blix
was concerned that while it was possible to establish material
balances
up to 1998,
it was less clear how Iraq’s flat denial of any activity since
then
should be
treated.
•
Iraq was
being “hyper-active”; there has been some private interviews
over
the
previous weekend, one of which – on UAVs – had been
“informative”.
In response
to UK questions reflecting concerns that interviews would
still
be monitored,
Dr Blix said that interviewees had not been searched
and
“there could
of course be bugs in the room”.
•
Dr Blix
saw attractions in the Canadian proposal, which would help to
unite
the Council
around key tests, which were becoming evident from the
“clusters”
document,
and a deadline; and had mentioned possible deadlines of 1
May
or 1 June.
•
The UK had
argued that the risk was that “we would simply end up
back
at square
one a couple of months hence”.
•
In a
separate E10 discussion of the Canadian proposal, Germany had
declared
it could
not countenance an ultimatum and others “had not seemed
particularly
interested,
perhaps as it brought the Council back to the same place in the
end”.
•
The
majority of the E10 were more concerned about US statements the
previous
weekend
that the aim of US action was regime change.283
913.
In separate
advice “on the end game options”, Sir Jeremy Greenstock stated
that
there was
little chance of bridging the gap with the French – “senior
politicians were
dug in too
deep”; and that a French veto appeared “more of a danger than
failure to get
914.
Sir Jeremy had
told Mr Annan that “the UK would not give up on finding a
non-war
route if we
possibly could”; and that “the French/German/Russian proposal …
merely
diminished
the pressure on Saddam”.
915.
Sir Jeremy
identified the options as:
•
“… stay
firm … and go with the US military campaign in the second half
of
March with
the best arguments we can muster … if a second resolution …
is
unobtainable,
we fall back on 1441 and regret that the UN was not up to it
…”;
•
“… make
some small concessions that might just be enough to get, e.g.
Chile
and Mexico
on board”. The “most obvious step” might be “ultimatum
language”
making
military action the default if the Council did not agree that Iraq
had come
into
compliance with resolution 1441;
283
Telegram
338 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 3
March’.
284
Telegram
339 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 4 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: End
Game Options’.
345