The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Director Directorate of Joint Capability. The committee, with the DECs, would ensure

that FP development was “coherent across the DLODs [Defence Lines of Developments]

and prioritised in accordance with current and future vulnerabilities”.

740.  The risk management process was laid out as:

• “Identify. The key to efficient risk management is the identification of adversary,

natural and human threats to the Force, which, if not tempered, would

otherwise impact upon mission success. That includes the anticipation of

increasing and emergent threats, particularly where it may take time to develop

countermeasures.”

• “Assess” – assessing the probability and impact of the identified threats on

mission success.

• “Address. Resource constraints inevitably mean that Defence cannot protect

against all threats at all times in all circumstances.” That meant that investment

in capabilities had to be prioritised. It added: “Where a lack of resources or

mitigation activity could impact adversely on mission success, commanders

must communicate, through the chain of command, the need to review the

risk level.”

• “Review. Staff and commanders must manage risk proactively by monitoring the

risk profile, assessing the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures and reporting

upwards FP shortfalls or unavoidable risk issues.”

741.  Although the policy did not refer specifically to Theatre Entry Standards for

minimum levels of protection, it did identify the leads for a comprehensive range of force

protection elements, and what their considerations should be.

742.  The policy lead for platform protection was the Directorate of Joint Capability

but responsibility for its capabilities was spread across the relevant DECs and was

co‑ordinated on behalf of DCDS(EC) through the Joint Capabilities Board. It said:

“Procurement staffs must balance key user requirements and forecast operational

exigencies against current and future threats to deliver the appropriate degree

of platform protection … Operational staffs must risk manage the employment

of platforms according to the threat and the level of tolerable risk.”

743.  The policy said that the Joint Commander398 owned the operational risk for forces

under his command. The CDS was responsible for articulating the risk for specific

operations and the Defence Secretary owned the risk inherent in the activities of the

Armed Forces on behalf of the Government.

744.  The MOD told the Inquiry that the latest iteration of the force protection policy,

dated 21 May 2015, “defines risk ownership and governance more clearly than

398  Confirmed by the MOD as CJO for Operation TELIC; Letter Duke‑Evans to Aldred, 26 June 2015,

‘Procuring Military Equipment’.

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