The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
108.
Addressing
“what should we be doing while Washington plans and we try
to
influence
them”, Mr Sawers wrote:
“Conventional
advice will be to plough on in New York, get the Goods Review
List
agreed, and
work to implement the SCRs by sending back the
inspectors.
“We should
think long and hard on the last point. There is not a shred of
evidence
that Saddam
is willing to open up his WMD plants to the UN. We would
be
sending
people … on a fool’s errand and offering them as hostages. We could
be
precipitating
the very crisis we would rather avoid, on terms favourable to
Saddam
… and we
would offer an opportunity on a plate to the hawks in Washington.
And if
it is the
UK in the lead, as we usually are, we will suffer a heavier
backlash … We
need to
have an agreed strategy with Washington before we head down a
road
which might
look sensible, legal, UN-friendly etc, but only leads us into the
jam we
are trying
to avoid.”
109.
Mr Sawers
concluded:
“Visiting
Americans say privately that there is still a debate to be had in
Washington.
Powell is
not as lonely a voice as he might seem. We know that Bush, at the
end of
the day,
will be both intelligent and responsible. If we can help the
Americans come
up with a
persuasive plan to oust the world’s worst tyrant, then we should do
so. And
if the best
military and intelligence brains in London and Washington fail to
produce
a
convincing plan, then we stick to containment.”34
110.
Mr Sawers’
letter and its distribution caused some consternation in
No.10.
111.
Sir David
Manning told Mr Powell that he had:
“… asked
the FCO to turn him off. Not helpful to have this winging its way
around
the world …
If John/other HOMs [Heads of Mission] want to offer views, they
should
be in
personal letters to Michael Jay.”35
“I was gob
smacked by this. John deserves a slapping down.”36
113.
As a result,
the FCO sent a personal response to Mr Sawers and other
Heads
of Mission
who had been sent copies of his teleletter stating:
“Your
teleletter of 21 February … raises a number of highly sensitive
issues. I can
assure you
that thought is being given to them, necessarily on a highly
restricted
basis. You
will understand that correspondence, widely copied, on these
issues
34
Teleletter
Sawers to Jay, 21 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Policy’.
35
Manuscript
comment Manning to Powell, 22 February 2002, on Teleletter Sawers
to Jay, 21 February
2002,
‘Iraq: Policy’.
36
Manuscript
comment Powell to Manning on Teleletter Sawers to Jay, 21 February
2002, ‘Iraq: Policy’.
406