The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
497.
Dr Blix
wrote that on 13 March Sir Jeremy had:
“… tried
desperately to win support for the British benchmark paper. If he
got
‘traction’
on it, he could be flexible on a number of points, even altogether
dropping
the draft
operative paragraph 3 or, indeed the whole draft resolution, which
looked
like an
ultimatum. Although this step was presented as a last concession,
the
political
signal of the benchmark paper standing alone would probably be seen
as
an
ultimatum. It would be understood that if the declaration was not
made and/or
the benchmarks
not attained, serious consequences could be
expected.”154
498.
Asked by the
Inquiry if he was aware in the second half of the week
beginning
10 March
that the Prime Minister and the President had decided on 12
March
that the
game was up; and that the UK would, for appearances’ sake,
continue
negotiations
in New York for a couple more days, and then withdraw the
resolution,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock
replied “No”.155
499.
Sir Jeremy
added that activity had “really stopped after Wednesday [12
March]”
and
that:
“On
Thursday morning, which was probably my most difficult day, I
suspected that
somebody
would put down an alternative resolution, saying that the use of
force
should not
be allowed, because we knew that the Mexicans and the Chileans
were
beginning
to draft that …
“… By
Friday morning there was an eerie silence. Nothing was happening.
We were
not
negotiating. Nobody was putting down anything against us. We knew
that the
allies were
going to meet … at the weekend, and there was no negotiating
going
on in
New York.”
500.
Although
there had been unanimous support for a rigorous inspections
and
monitoring
regime backed by the threat of military force as the means to
disarm
Iraq when
resolution 1441 was adopted, there was no such consensus in
the
Security
Council in March 2003.
501.
Although the
Security Council had unanimously agreed resolution 1441
on
8 November,
there were marked differences in the positions of the members of
the
Council,
particularly between the five Permanent Members – China, France,
Russia,
the US and
the UK, reflecting the history of the Security Council’s role in
relation to Iraq
since
1991.
154
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc,
2005.
155
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, pages 35-36.
486