12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
756.
Despite
improvements in size and performance of the ISF, concerns
about
corruption,
infiltration and abuse continued to grow during 2005. The incident
on
19 September
at the Jameat Police Station in Basra is described later in this
Section.
757.
In its 12
October Assessment, the JIC reported that both the IMOD and the
MOI
were
“dysfunctional, with their capacities developing very slowly if at
all” and that neither
could
“administer their forces effectively”.709
Units were
unpaid and unsupplied for
significant
periods and nepotism was ingrained.
758.
The JIC
repeated its warnings about the IPS, judging:
“Elements
of the ISF, primarily those under Ministry of Interior (MOI)
control, are
involved in
sectarian violence. This is fuelling broader tensions across
Iraq.
“The Iraqi
police are a particular concern. They often suffer from divided
loyalties
and a
significant number are involved in criminality for financial gain.
Their command
and control
mechanisms remain confused, as does the exact relationship
between
local
police and the MOI in Baghdad.”
759.
The JIC
reported that some senior Iraqi politicians viewed MOI paramilitary
units
as “a
particular problem: they are seen as a Shia force and as
perpetrating a campaign
of violence
against Sunnis”.
760.
On 25 October,
Mr Blair and President Bush held a video conference
between
London,
Washington and Baghdad.710
Mr Straw
and a number of officials and military
officers
were in attendance. They discussed Iraqiisation. Mr Blair said
that the
development
of the police seemed to be lagging behind that of the army and
asked
what more
could be done. He also asked how important were the Ministries of
Interior
and
Defence. He was told that a major effort was required with the
police in 2006 and
that the
Ministries were crucial. Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton,
SBMR-I from
October
2005 to March 2006, said that the problem with the police was not
limited to
their
quantity and quality; there was also an issue with the commitment
to national goals.
Strong
national leadership was required at the political
level.
761.
In response to
a question from President Bush about the situation in
the
South,
Sir William Patey, British Ambassador to Iraq, stated that the
political process
had exposed
deep divisions within the Shia and that those had impacted on
local
government.
He warned of “local turf wars”, declining consent for the MNF, and
Iranian
interference.
He stated that the police were key and training efforts needed to
be
stepped up.
Lt Gen Houghton said that the situation in the South remained
much calmer
than in
other parts of the country. Progress had been made on SSR and the
South might
well be
able to lead the process of security transition.
709
JIC
Assessment, 12 October 2005, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Very Slow
Progress’.
710
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 25 October 2005, ‘Iraq:
London/Washington/Baghdad VTC’.
227