The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Sawers
reported just before the Order was issued that it was being
finalised by the
Department
of Defense in Washington and that Ambassador Bremer had been
given
guidance on
de‑Ba’athification by both Secretary Rumsfeld and President
Bush.46
Mr Sawers
told the Inquiry that he did not think that his views were entirely
ignored, and
cited
examples of where he believed he had been able to influence
Ambassador Bremer’s
thinking.47
He made a
similar point in May 2003, when he reported that
Ambassador
Bremer was
keen to work with him:
“… in
public and private, and has picked up on many UK suggestions, big
and small.
He allowed
us to re‑balance the decree on removing the Ba’athists, over‑ruling
the
wilder
strictures of Wolfowitz and Feith in the process.”48
63.
Mr Sawers
reported on 17 May that the members of the Iraqi Leadership
Group49
“widely
supported” the de‑Ba’athification process and that:
“… all the
leaders welcomed the clarity and toughness of the proclamation
…
I recalled
the exchanges I had had with each of the Group on the issue,
and
told them
their views had been taken into account in the detailed terms of
the
final
decree – a good example of co‑operation and consultation with the
political
64.
A few days
later, Mr Sawers reported that de‑Ba’athification had “gone
down well”.51
He judged
that, before the policy, many Iraqis believed there was still a
chance the
Ba’athists
might return, which “in turn contributed to the security problem”.
The policy
was “a huge
hit with the political parties we are working with” and, although
there would
need to be
some exemptions, “Bremer will keep these to a
minimum”.
65.
A few days
after Order No.1 was issued, Sir David Manning met
Ambassador
Bremer in
Baghdad.52
In
discussion, they observed:
“De‑Ba’athification
and the dissolution of security ministries would create a
new
reservoir
of angry men. So there was a need to step up patrols and tighten
up
security.”
46
Telegram 6
IraqRep to FCO London, 13 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Putting Things
Right’.
47
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, page 71.
48
Telegram 18
IraqRep to FCO London, 20 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Bremer’s
Impact’.
49
The
Leadership Group was comprised of Iraqi politicians drawn from
identifiable political and regional
groups and
had been established by General Jay Garner, Head of the Office of
Reconstruction and
Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA). It included both former exiles who had returned
to Iraq after the fall
of Saddam
Hussein, and those who had remained in Iraq.
50
Telegram 13
UKRep Iraq to FCO London, 17 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Bremer meets
Leadership Group’.
51
Telegram 18
IraqRep to FCO London, 20 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Bremer’s
Impact’.
52
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 23 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Gerry
Bremer’.
14