9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007

548.  On 5 February, Mr Blair spoke to President Bush by video conference.282 Mr Blair

noted positive signs in relation to the Baghdad Security Plan, and advised:

“Our experience in Basra demonstrated that a well‑conducted security operation,

with political and reconstruction elements integrated into it, could deliver results in

terms of increased local consent, and political buy‑in.”

549.  Mr Blair told President Bush that the UK would maintain a presence at Basra

Palace to ensure that it had the ability and the tactical awareness to re‑intervene, and

would do more on training and mentoring. Once the ISF had progressed to a point

where insurgent groups could see they could not win militarily “they would have to

pursue other options”.

550.  In a separate conversation, Sir Nigel Sheinwald talked Secretary Rice and

Mr Hadley through “the plans set out by the Defence Secretary after his visit last week,

ie in relation to the Basra Palace site, ISF mentoring and embedding, and continued

action against the JAM”.283 Sir Nigel:

“… made clear that the re‑posturing would go ahead, but the details were being

worked on and were expected to lead to a smaller draw‑down than first planned –

but this could have a knock‑on impact on our plans for Afghanistan.”

551.  When they met on 6 February Mr Blair reassured Gen Petraeus that the UK would:

“… ensure that we retained good situational awareness, and the ability to

re‑intervene quickly and effectively. This would involve staying in the Basra Palace

site for the time being, and doing more on training and mentoring.”284

552.  On 7 February, the Chiefs of Staff noted that the “assumptions for the strategic

force balancing work remained unchanged and a sound, logical basis was required to

justify any continued presence in Basra Palace”.285

553.  From Baghdad, Mr Asquith was reporting conflicting perspectives within the Iraqi

Government on transition in Basra, ranging from insistence that a date must be set for

withdrawal to considering it a low priority.286

554.  On 8 February, Mr Asquith reported that the Baghdad Security Plan was about to

enter its critical phase and was “unquestionably the best [plan] so far”.287 Prime Minister

Maliki had appointed heavy hitters to head the political, economic and services strands.

282  Letter Banner to Hayes, 6 February 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 22 January [sic]:

Middle East issues’.

283  Letter Sheinwald to Hayes, 7 February 2007, ‘Dinner with US Secretary of State and National Security

Adviser, 5 February 2007’.

284  Letter Banner to McNeil, 6 February 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with David Petraeus’.

285  Minutes, 7 February 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

286  eGram 4996/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra – call on National Security

Adviser, 6 February’.

287  eGram 5326/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly Assessment’.

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