10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
933.
Dr Turner also
advised that the UK would need to redouble its effort on
the
economy:
“Presentationally,
the US effort risks overshadowing UK economic initiatives.
The
likelihood
is that the US will focus on quick impact projects … Funding will
come
from the US
military (up to US$70m) and the Government of Iraq (US$100m
or
more).
“We will
need to ensure our projects are co-ordinated and
complementary.
Experience
over the past five years in such [quick impact] projects is that
they
provide
short-term benefits, but are often not sustainable. DFID’s view
remains that
economic
recovery will require … a resolution to address the deep-seated
problems
in the
Basra economy and the building of sustainable Iraqi institutions …
Our
message to
the US will need to be that such work takes time.”
934.
In his weekly
report of 17 April, Maj Gen White-Spunner advised that
MND(SE)
continued
to focus on drawing as much US and Iraqi resource into Basra as
possible in
order to
take advantage of the “unexpected but very welcome changes” that
the Charge
of the
Knights had brought.547
935.
A DFID
official provided a briefing for Mr Alexander on the impact of
the Charge of
the Knights
on 18 April.548
Street-life
in Basra was “noticeably more confident”, with pop
music and
alcohol on sale. Dr al-Safi had set up a committee to review
project proposals
from the
Provincial Council, the Governor and local Sheikhs, but had said
that he did not
want
proposals from the coalition. He was determined that the Iraqi
Government should
be seen to
be in charge and favoured quick impact projects focused on
infrastructure,
implemented
through line ministries and tribal leaders. On the US side, “large
numbers”
of people
were flowing into the US CMOC.
936.
The major risk
for the UK Government remained that the Provincial
Government
would be
undermined by the decision to channel funding through line
ministries,
tribal
leaders and NGOs. The UK continued to engage with the US and Dr
al-Safi to
emphasise
the advantages of engaging with the Provincial Government, the
Provincial
Council and
the PRT, rather than creating parallel systems.
937.
Mr McDonald
told the 28 April meeting of the ISG that: “It was now clear that
there
was a
shared UK/US operation in the South, and that we would need to
decide on their
tasks and
the division of labour.” 549
The UK
needed to focus on its remaining political,
economic
and military tasks. The first two required provincial elections to
take place,
and tangible
outcomes from the work of Mr Wareing and the BDC.
547
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 17 April 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter –
17 April 2008’.
548
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 18 April 2008,
‘Information Note: Latest
Consequences
of Iraqi Operations in Basra’.
549
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 28 April 2008, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 28 April’.
347