6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
had
increased by up to 160 percent since 1990, placing Iraq bottom of
188 countries
assessed.
Malnutrition problems were also on the increase. Problems were less
acute
in northern
Iraq.
347.
On 1 August,
the Cabinet Office reported to Sir David Manning that Ms Short
had
agreed
proposals to make the DFID bilateral programme in Iraq “more
structured”.200
It also
reported that a review of DFID activity in Iraq was under way, but
that the focus
of
officials’ concern was the need to improve the UK’s understanding
of the existing
humanitarian
situation in Iraq.
348.
The first
product of DFID’s review of its Iraq programme, the ‘Northern
Iraq
Desktop
Review’, was circulated within DFID on 8 August.201
The Inquiry
has seen
no evidence
that it was copied outside the department.
349.
The ‘Desktop
Review’ drew on a combination of DFID papers and
consultations
with UN
agencies, NGOs and western European donor countries. It did not
take account
of UK
military planning. The reviewers commented: “Although we are aware
that the …
MOD … is
carrying out contingency planning for military action against Iraq,
the extent of
this
planning is not known.”
350.
Among their
conclusions, the DFID reviewers stated that:
•
OFF had
significantly improved the humanitarian situation in northern Iraq,
but it
could be
argued that it “had served to undermine the viability of local
economic
initiatives
and has been detrimental to coping mechanisms, contributing to
a
high degree
of vulnerability now and for the foreseeable future”.
•
60 percent
of the population was dependent on the OFF food basket and
“highly
vulnerable
to external shocks”.
•
Many civil
servants had resorted to alternative sources of income or left
the
country in
order to secure a stable income.
•
Development
projects aimed at building livelihoods were
“significantly
hampered”
by the scale of OFF and its destructive effect on local
markets,
particularly
in the agricultural sector.
351.
In her memoir,
Ms Short explained that:
“DFID had
been involved over many years in supporting efforts to ease
Iraqi
suffering.
It was easier to work in the north but we had some projects in
central Iraq
and were
well aware of how bad things were.”202
352.
The Inquiry
asked Sir William Patey what assessments the UK Government
had
made of the
humanitarian situation in Iraq before 2003 and in particular the
effect of
sanctions.
Sir William explained that the UK had great difficulty in
establishing whether
200
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 1 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
201
Minute CHAD
Operations Team [junior official] to [DFID junior official], 8
August 2002, ‘Northern Iraq
Desktop
Review and Background Briefing Document’ attaching Paper, Conflict
and Humanitarian Affairs
Department,
July 2002, ‘Northern Iraq Desktop Review and Background Briefing
Document’.
202
Short
C. An
Honourable Deception: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of
Power. The Free
Press, 2004.
171