The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The paper
also highlighted that the Petraeus Plan would strain budgets and
require
“sustained
high level lobbying” of key allies to extend their deployment as
many MNF
contributors
expected deployment to cease in 2005, earlier than required by the
Plan.
593.
Mr Phillipson,
in summarising the paper to Mr Blair, described it as “too
vague, and
does not
tally with loss of control compared to the situation on the ground
in early July,
not least
in Basra”.539
On
Iraqiisation, Mr Phillipson suggested:
“The paper
says that Iraqiisation is on track. We should ask for a more
explicit
assessment.
What were the original timelines and benchmarks? What is
our
performance
against them? How and where can they be tightened up
and
accelerated?
There is a tendency to fear that this will increase costs – we
should
make clear
that this should not be a bar to the necessary policy
judgements.
On timelines
we also need to challenge the assertion that MNF forces
will
now need to
be in Iraq at present levels until 2006 – we should be looking
to
move as
quickly as possible to a shift from offensive MNF forces to a
smaller
training and
advisory deployment.”
594.
On 29 August,
Mr Blair produced a minute in response which expressed
that
although
the rationale behind Iraqiisation was “fine”, the “urgency of the
situation may
overwhelm
us and make our timescales … naive”.540
Mr Blair
stressed the need for
immediate
action:
“Allawi has
to be given, by hook or by crook, immediate strong, well‑armed
brigades
who can
move into any trouble‑spot and clean up. This has got to take
precedence
over the
General Petraeus plan. But we cannot have a row over equipment. If
he
needs the
stuff, he has got to have it.”
595.
On 9
September, Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Mr David Quarrey, a
Private Secretary
in No.10,
sent Mr Blair a minute reporting their recent visit to Iraq,
for use in Mr Blair’s
planned
video conference with President Bush.541
They
reported:
“Iraqiisation
is on a trajectory which will take us well into 2005, and maybe
into 2006,
before they
can stand on their own. The police are doing better than the Army.
There
are real
capacity issues in the key ministries, though throwing more
advisers at them
might not
help. We seriously need to make a UK national contribution to
speeding up
equipment
supply.”
596.
The minute
stated that the US NSC and No.10 would need to “be all over”
the
issue in
coming months to ensure further progress and the need to maintain
pressure for
delivery on
Iraqiisation should be one of the key messages for Mr Blair’s
conversation
with
President Bush.
539
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
540
Minute
Prime Minister to Sheinwald, Powell and Phillipson, 29 August 2004,
‘Iraq’.
541
Minute
Sheinwald and Quarrey to Prime Minister, 9 September 2004,
‘Iraq’.
186