The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Mr Lavrov
was disappointed that the draft did not take on board
comments
on a number
of issues, but he had been instructed to focus on
four:
{{“… 30
days was unrealistic for a declaration covering non‑WMD
chemical
and
biological programmes.” That was “important given omissions …
could
trigger a
material breach”.
{{The
draft language in OP4 “created a casus belli before the report
reached
the
Council”. He had been instructed to insist on the earlier
French
formulation,
referring to a material breach being reported to the
Council,
“in accordance
with Ops 11 and 12”.
{{A
preference for French language on Presidential sites in
OP7.
{{The
reference to restoring international peace and security in the
draft
of OP12 was
not appropriate “(it was not clear it would need
restoring)”.
He could
compromise on “secure”.
•
Mr Wang
Yingfan, Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN,
shared
Mr Lavrov’s
view on OP4 and was not clear what “assessment” meant
in Chinese.
•
Mr Levitte
said that unanimity was essential. OP4 “had to refer to OPs 11
‘and’
12, not 11
‘or’ 12”: “‘Or’ could mean a meeting taking place, not on a report
from
Blix, but
from a Council member. If this was the intention, the result would
be
conflicting
reports from different Members. If reports were not sent through
Blix
or
ElBaradei we would end up with a very ambiguous situation … He
expected
Powell and
Villepin to address the issue.”
797.
In subsequent
discussion, the US said OP4 created a distinction between
an
“automatic
casus belli” and “automaticity for the use of force”: “further
failures to comply
would
constitute a material breach, but that material breach would result
in a Council
discussion”.
Ambassador Negroponte “clarified” that an omission in the
declaration
(required
by OP3) “on its own would not constitute a material
breach”.
798.
In a bilateral
discussion with Ambassador Negroponte, Sir Jeremy suggested
that
“and” could
be reinstated in OP4 but the use of “or” should be retained in OP12
(which
provided
for the Council to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in
accordance
799.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 7 November that after the return of
inspectors
to Iraq,
“tricky questions would arise about whether Iraq had breached
its
obligations
and what steps should be taken”.
272
Telegram
2119 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 7 November 2002, ‘Iraq: P5
Meeting and Contacts
with
Negroponte’.
336