The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
logistic
vehicles) need to be taken forward. If we are to keep open our
options on
engaging,
at or about the same time as the earliest potential US deployment
in the
North, work
on all
of these
UORs plus others would need to be taken forward with
the
commitment of additional resources, and publicly visible placing of
orders in
early
October.”
207.
The record of
the Chiefs of Staff discussion on 19 September shows
that
Adm Boyce
stated “there was still an embargo on discussing UORs with
industry, and
the issues
could still not be discussed with a wider
audience”.96
208.
The minutes
from the meeting also recorded that Lt Gen Pigott’s draft
advice
to
Ministers was to be rewritten to include an explanation of the
impact on future
operations.
209.
A note from
Mr Watkins on 19 September stated that the draft advice
was shown
to Mr Hoon
and Lord Bach, Parliamentary Under Secretary and Minister of State
for
Defence
Procurement, that day.97
210.
Lt Gen
Pigott produced further advice on 26 September that did not
contain the
same level
of detail on UORs.98
The only
reference to them stated:
“In MOD and
PJHQ there is detailed work in hand on a range of force
preparation
issues.
Those relating to the call-out of Reservists, training and Urgent
Operational
Requirements
are the most pressing. The implications of this work will bear on
our
force
options so we need to retain the necessary flexibility, until all
this is clearer.”
211.
On
20 September, No.10 was informed that Package 2 comprised
13,000
personnel
(Special Forces, Air and Maritime).99
Consideration
was also being given to
including a
Commando group of 1,700 Royal Marines personnel. Package 3
(comprising
a
Divisional HQ and an armoured brigade plus supporting elements),
would comprise
a further
28,000 personnel.
212.
Mr Brown
agreed proposals, in principle, for funding UORs on
23 September.
The
arrangements were confirmed on 4 October.
213.
On
23 September, Mr Blair agreed with Mr Hoon that
Package 2 could be offered
as a
potential UK contribution but there was a misunderstanding over
whether the US
should be
informed that the UK was still considering a land option (Package
3). That
issue is
detailed in Section 6.1.
96
Minutes,
19 September 2002, Chiefs of Staff (Operations)
meeting.
97
Minute
Watkins to PSO/CDS, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to Any US-led
Action’.
98
Minute
DCDS(C) to CJO, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential Scale of
UK Force Contribution For Use
in UK/US
Contingency Planning’.
99
Minute
Watkins to Manning, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to any Military Action’.
32