3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
374.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock commented that Dr Blix’s presentation had been
“more
equivocal
than 27 January, highlighting progress on process and other
‘hopeful’ signs
(e.g. new
documents, the Iraqi commissions and the Iraqi decree on
WMD)”.102
375.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote that it paid to re-read Dr Blix’s reports
of 14 February:
“It was
clear that compliance was stepped up significantly as the prospect
of military
action
became more real, but it was also clear that the problem was
unlikely to
be resolved
unless those running Iraq had a genuine and not transitory
change
of heart …
“They
[UNMOVIC] were hopeful that Iraq could be disarmed; but the report
still
concluded
compliance had yet to conform to the requirement of the UN
resolution
376.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that the IAEA had found no evidence of
ongoing
prohibited
nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq, although a
number
of issues
were still under investigation.
377.
Dr ElBaradei
reported that:
•
The IAEA
had conducted an additional 38 inspections at 19 locations
since
his report
to the Council on 27 January.
•
Iraq had
continued to provide immediate access at all
locations.
•
The IAEA
had continued to interview key personnel and had recently
been
able to
conduct four interviews in private, although the interviewees
had
recorded
their interviews. In the meeting in Baghdad, Iraq had “reconfirmed
its
commitment
to encourage its citizens to accept interviews in private, both
inside
and outside
of Iraq”.
•
Iraq had
expanded the list of relevant personnel to more than 300 to
include
higher-level
key scientists; IAEA continued to ask for information
about
personnel
of lesser rank.
•
The IAEA
intended to increase the numbers of inspectors and support staff
and
to “expand
and intensify the range of technical meetings and
interviews”.104
378.
Iraq had
provided documentation relating to the reported attempt to
import
uranium,
the attempted procurement of aluminium tubes, the procurement of
magnets
and magnet
production capability, and the use of HMX. The IAEA was pursuing
the
102
Telegram
265 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Blix and
ElBaradei
Presentations:
Open Debate’.
103
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
104
UN Security
Council, ‘4707th Meeting Friday 14 February 2003’
(S/PV.4707).
247