The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
659.
The Assistant
Private Secretary also recorded that Ambassador Bremer
had
briefed
Mr Blair that Mr Richmond had been put in charge of the
operational aspects
of the
CPA’s ‘Sunni strategy’. This included up to US$250m in project
funding, and
attempts at
political mobilisation. Sir Jeremy Greenstock observed “that there
were signs
that the
Sunni tribal leadership was spontaneously taking an increased
interest in the
political
process”.
660.
Ambassador
Bremer had also offered his perspective on the impact of the
capture
of Saddam
Hussein. In his judgement the “psychological impact of the arrest
was
significant
on those who either hoped for or feared the restoration of the old
regime”.
661.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock called on Mr Blair on 8 January.364
662.
On the
political process, Sir Jeremy told Mr Blair that there was a
genuine risk of a
fatwa by
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani against the proposed caucus procedure,
and that in
such a case
the Coalition could not afford to back down.
663.
Sir Jeremy
told the Inquiry that his engagement with the GC and others
was
“an
inadequate interface”: he and Ambassador Bremer were very conscious
that they
couldn’t
have a direct conversation with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani as he
refused to have
any direct
dealings with the CPA.365
664.
In their video
conference on 6 January Mr Blair and President Bush discussed
the
UN role in
the political process and agreed it was important.366
Mr Blair
suggested that
Mr Annan
should say that direct elections to the Transitional Assembly were
impractical,
giving
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani a “way to row back from his call for
direct elections”.
665.
The discussion
then moved on to media issues. Mr Blair commented that he
had
been struck
by the high level of satellite TV coverage in Iraq and the absence
of Iraqi
politicians
using the media effectively. Relying on word of mouth enhanced the
power
of
religious and tribal leaders. Mr Blair suggested that improved
media would allow the
Coalition
to reach the Iraqi public that bypassed those
intermediaries.
666.
Before the
video conference, Mr Scarlett had briefed Mr Blair based
on a draft of
the 7
January JIC Assessment.367
667.
In its 7
January Assessment, the JIC considered the security situation in
Iraq.368
It reported
that a downward trend in the number of attacks against Coalition
Forces
continued,
but that it was too soon to judge whether it would last. Some
attacks were
showing
increasing sophisticaltion and co-ordination. There had been no
significant
change in
MND(SE).
364
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 8 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Sir Jeremy Greenstock’.
365
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 55.
366
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 6 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video-Conference with President
Bush, 6
January’.
367
Minute
Scarlett to Cannon, 6 January 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
368
JIC
Assessment, 7 January 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
316