3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
266.
Mr Ricketts
reported that he had said the UK would consider “a range of
formulae
which we
would pass the Americans very privately”. He also drew attention to
the likely
sensitivities
in Washington to a change of approach.
267.
Sir David
Manning discussed the French and Russian reactions with
Dr Rice on
268.
Sir David
reported that he had decided not to get into a detailed
discussion
about one
resolution or two, although he had said that Mr Blair
“remained very firm on
substance
and would want to be convinced that the two resolution route would
work”.
269.
Sir David
Manning and Dr Rice also discussed what had happened over
Kosovo.
Sir David
asked for “a note setting out our own views on Kosovo” before he
spoke to
Dr Rice
the next day.
270.
Mr Straw
discussed French concerns, about “how far a UN resolution
should
rewrite
arrangements for weapons inspections and ‘automaticity’ of military
action”,
with Mr de
Villepin on 30 September.93
271.
Mr Straw
told Mr de Villepin that the “resolution had to be tough
enough so
Saddam
understood this was his last chance”; and that “a peaceful solution
was more
likely to
be found through a strong and clear resolution”. The provisions in
resolution
1284 were
“unsatisfactory, not least on the access to Presidential
sites”.
272.
Mr Straw
warned Mr de Villepin that:
“… we had
to ensure that Washington could keep on board those within
the
Administration
who were averse to handling Iraq in the UN. If that required
one
resolution,
France would still have the option of tabling … another if it did
not like
what the US
proposed.”
273.
In
Mr Straw’s view, there would be “serious difficulties” without
an international
consensus.
He and Mr de Villepin agreed that should be the
aim.
274.
In a telegram
later that day, Sir John Holmes identified a number of
underlying
French
concerns, including:
•
a French
conviction that the US were set on a policy of regime
change;
•
the damage
“unilateral(ish) action … would do to the UN’s credibility and
thus
to French
influence in the world”;
•
the
“precedents unilateral pre‑emptive action could set”;
•
the “damage
it would do to the whole way international relations
work”;
92
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 30 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
93
Telegram
208 FCO London to Paris, 30 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation with
French
Foreign Minister, 30 September’.
249