The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
A third
paper which offered “some thoughts on the risks and costs of US
attacks
295.
In the first
paper, SIS4 set out the issues that would bear on planning for
regime
change in
Iraq, including:
•
The “read
across from Afghanistan (cf Richard Perle’s ideas)” was
“deceptive”.
The
defences of the Iraqi regime were “formidable” and the Tikritis
were “not a
bunch of
Taliban”.
•
Neighbouring
Arab states preferred “the Sunnis” to the Shia “alternative”,
and
feared
“Kurdish expansionism”.
•
Iraqi external
opposition groups were “divided, badly penetrated” by
Iraqi
intelligence
and had “little credibility inside Iraq”.
•
Action
against Iraq would undermine the unity of purpose of the war
against
terror.
•
There was
“no convincing intelligence (or common sense) case that
Iraq
supports
Sunni extremism”.
•
There were
“significant fragilities” in the countries neighbouring
Iraq.
•
The
implications of a “US installed regime in Iraq” for the UK’s
regional alliances
were “not
at all positive”: “‘Fundamentalism’ would be boosted.”
•
It was “not
clear” that destruction of identified WMD facilities “would do
more
than
temporarily arrest Iraq’s WMD capabilities”.
•
There was
no identified nuclear target.
296.
Setting out a
“Strategic View”, SIS4 wrote:
•
Action
against Iraq “climbs a steep gradient of complex regional
opposition”.
•
EU
co-ordination would be “problematic”.
•
Co-ordination
by the Security Council had been “difficult” because of
Iraqi
influence
on Russia and, to a lesser extent, China.
•
Iraq policy
was “inextricably tied up with the problem of Israel”.
•
Egypt,
which was “vital to UK interests in the Middle East” was
“vulnerable to
Iraqi
influence due to the failure of MEPP”.
•
Maintaining
international cohesion against terrorism was “a prior
imperative”.
•
Iraq was
“succeeding in eroding sanctions” but isolation was “costing
Baghdad
heavily”.
Maintaining regional balances, “especially with Iran”, was “a
problem
for
Saddam”.
297.
SIS4 told the
Inquiry he had been asked to produce the paper that afternoon
and
140
Letter PS/C
to Manning, 3 December 2001, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper ‘Iraq’; Paper
‘Iraq: Further Thoughts’
and Paper
‘US Attacks on Iraq: The Risks and Costs’.
141
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 7.
362